Multi Alignment Re-defining Diplomacy
                     Multi-alignment: Re-defining diplomacy 
 
The change from NAM in India's relationships is no longer dependent on, or pegged to, the 
world's interpretation of our country's internal affairs 
India's stand vis-a-vis Russia and the US has been hailed by many strategic experts as NAM 
2.0. However, differing geopolitical realities such as the new Cold War, the rise of China, the 
dominance of energy security and the safety of the shipping lanes had made it imperative for 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi to think beyond the traditional domain of non-alignment. 
Modi has reoriented the non-alignment into a more positive force known as multi-alignment 
to achieve India's comprehensive security. Thus, the two policies are not on the same level 
playing field and are not synonymous. The test of both policies has come from China's 
direction, first in 1962 and then in the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. In order to understand the 
practicality of multi-alignment, one needs to flip back a few pages of history. 
Moscow's position in the 1962 war was neutrality, and it urged both sides to resolve their 
differences bilaterally and amicably. Only later, when Nehru pressed Russia for help, it 
reaffirmed its promise to supply MIG aircraft to India. When the American aid started pouring 
in, the Soviets fearing India's tilt toward the US, increased their assistance. Despite giving 
India a military aid of $65 million, the US was watchful of potential Indian aggression against 
Pakistan. The aid was accompanied by 'tutoring' about India's "true friends". The US warned 
of "appropriate action both within and without the United Nations" if India initiated any open 
hostilities against Islamabad. 
Further, the deceitful conduct of many Afro-Asian nations during the 1962 war, despite India's 
commendable role in the 1950 Korean War and the 1956 Suez crisis, came as a rude shock for 
Nehru. The Chinese aggression was not criticised, and India did not even gain their 
sympathies. Only the then United Arab Republic and Israel supported India's position and 
supplied arms at the request of Nehru. The policy did not fail India; instead, the over 
expectations did. There was no balance of interests. The test of non-alignment proved that it 
is not the intentions that are a deciding factor; instead, pragmatism and realism should be 
the crucial determinants of any foreign and security policy.   
Modi has successfully grasped the foundation of NAM along with its constraints. He has 
steered India towards a multi alignment policy. The country is no longer chained by "you are 
either with us or against us" geopolitics. Consequently, during the Galwan Valley clashes, the 
Russian stand was more or less the same with its focus on 'neutrality' and the US to limit 
China's influence in the South and East Asian region stood by India. However, despite its 
strategic alliance with China, Russia could not do anything much to appease Beijing. 
The Ukrainian conflict further tested the limits of India's multi-alignment policy. Russia and 
the US grapple for India's positive overtures towards themselves. Moscow's appreciation of 
India's current foreign policy and the statement of Dalip Singh that Russia would do little in 
case of a Chinese belligerency speaks volumes of the competition between the two for India's 
geopolitical convergences. The acceptance by the US at the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue that 
Indo-Russo ties developed when the US was unable to be its partner ensures that the Indian 
interests are now formally acknowledged. The triangular dynamics of Russia, the US and India 
have been reversed in India's favour. 
Russia's actions in Ukraine have attracted economic sanctions. Despite its belligerency against 
India, China is hesitant to defy the sanctions openly. Moscow looks towards India for its sale 
of energy resources such as oil. The fact that Germany and other nations cannot immediately 
halt their energy trade with Russia is indicative of the primacy of national interests over the 
ideological or other 'like mindedness' factors. On the other hand, Washington has been 
militarily used by Pakistan -- first as a 'major non-NATO player' through official arms supplies 
and second by its deceitful support to the Taliban. It has taken around sixty years for the US 
to truly understand the role of Pakistan in advocating terrorism and creating regional 
instabilities in South and Central Asia. The prior considerations of an alliance with Pakistan 
are no longer present, which has paved the way for a robust military trade apart from the US 
assurances of tactical support in case of Chinese aggression. 
So, what are the possible gains from practising a multi-alignment policy? First, a chance to 
convince Russia for gaining air basing rights in Ayni and Farkhor air bases in Tajikistan. India 
can strategically use the Russian leverage in its favour. From 2002-to 2010, India spent $70 
million to renovate the bases under its Connect Central Asia policy. It will be a game-changer 
for the Indian armed forces in regular warfare and ensure that Pakistan cut short its proxy 
war against India. Second, Russia would be unwilling to treat Pakistan as a 'zipper of Pan 
Eurasian integration', possibly nipping the blossoming Russo-Pak strategic proximity. A 
decreased geopolitical importance of Pakistan would surely benefit Russia, India and the US, 
for Islamic fundamentalism affects all the three powers, although in varying degrees. During 
the Galwan clashes, Russia asserted its position of non-interference; yet, India's vote 
absenteeism ensured that at the right time, the Russians would not delay the spare parts 
supply for various fighter jets Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s, MiG29K and the T-90 battle tanks apart 
from the Kilo-class submarines. Russia has already started the delivery of the second 
squadron of the S-400 missile system. Finally, the new possibilities of low-cost energy trade 
and Russia's precious vote in the UNSC can strengthen India's position. 
Regarding the US, the waivers of purchase of Russian arms and spare parts along with oil 
ensure the continuation of India's strategic autonomy. The US has further verbally committed 
itself to stand by India in case of Chinese aggression. Both the countries aim for joint 
development and production of hi-tech weapons under the Bilateral Defence Technology and 
Trade Initiative (DTTI). The government of India and the people are very mindful that both 
the U.S. and Russia can only provide military support and assure positive overtures in the 
UNSC. The Ukraine conflict teaches the world the biggest military lesson that a nation has to 
fight its wars. If imposed on the country, the war has to be fought by the Indians themselves. 
Moreover, Modi happens to be the first PM who has broadly understood the dynamics of a 
war-based economy in international relations and has initiated several measures for boosting 
indigenous defence manufacturing, such as the specialised vehicles for infantry. Additionally, 
the de-linking of internal issues from the international ones is another achievement of India's 
current foreign policy. During NAM, India was assessed by the foreign governments 
concerning domestic issues. Instead, today, the world understands that abrogation of Article 
370 and the Citizenship Amendment Act are altogether internal issues and are not open to 
international politics. Finally, Sino-Pak habitual disrespect to the bilateral agreements has 
been halted as the government can successfully communicate that only previously signed 
bilateral agreements would be considered while resolving the issues. Thus, the onus of 
respecting the LAC and LOC lies on China and Pakistan, respectively. To conclude, Henry 
Kissinger had once said, "the task of the leader is to get his people from where they are to 
where they have not been" and the multi-alignment policy has proved just that.  
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views 
expressed are personal.)