historyofphturner xxxx
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This PPT Aims at Understanding The  Bases of Philosophy to Overcome the 
Problems of Social Sciences
History of Philosophy
BY
WILLIAM TURNER, S.T.D.
BOSTON, U.S.A., AND LONDON GINN & 
COMPANY, PUBLISHERS ®be 9UI)ensetun 
press
ENTERED AT STATIONERS’ HALL
COPYRIGHT, 1903
BY WILLIAM 
TURNER
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
24.9
PREFAC E
THE purpose of the writer in compiling this text-book has 
been so to set forth the succession of schools and systems 
of philosophy as to accord to Scholasticism a presentation in 
some degree adequate to its importance in the history of 
speculative thought.
Of the text-books that are at present available for use in 
the lecture room, some dismiss the Scholastic period with a 
paragraph ; others, while dealing with it more 
sympathetically, treat it from the point of view of German 
transcendentalism. The result is that even works which 
succeed in doing justice to the schoolmen are practically 
useless to students who are more familiar with the 
terminology of Scholasticism than with that of Hegelianism.
The scope of the work has determined not only the 
general arrangement of the volume, but also the selection 
of material and of bibliographical references. Under the title 
“ Sources,” the student will find mention of the most recent 
publications and of one or two standard works which have 
been selected as being most easy of access. Bibliography is 
rapidly becoming a distinct branch of study in the different 
departments of philosophy. Dr. Rand’s Bibliography of 
Philosophy, which is to be published as the third volume of 
Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, will 
doubtless meet the demand as far as completeness is 
concerned, and will render unnecessary the attempt to 
furnish
iii
IV PREFACE
complete lists of sources in a text-book such as this is 
intended to be. It is, therefore, with a view to inculcate a 
proper idea of historical method rather than to supply a 
complete bibliography that a paragraph entitled “ Sources ” 
is prefixed to each chapter.
Similarly, it is for the purpose of impressing on the student 
the importance of estimating the value of systems and 
schools of philosophy that, at the end of each chapter, 
suggestions for criticism are offered under the title “ 
Historical Position.” No one is more keenly alive than the 
author himself to the absurdity of regarding such criticisms 
as possessing more than a relative value. If they sometimes 
convey to the reader a sense of intended finality, allowance 
will perhaps be made for the impossibility of finding, within 
the limits of a text-book, space for a more ample discussion 
of questions which are far from being finally and 
incontrovertibly settled.
The plan of the work precludes much claim to originality. 
Use has been made of primary sources wherever it was 
possible to do so. In dealing with Scholastic philosophy, 
especially, recourse has been had to the works of the 
schoolmen, experience having abundantly shown the danger 
of relying on secondary authorities for this period. The 
frequent mention, both in the text and in the notes, of 
Zeller’s Philosophic der Grice hen, of Stockl’s Lchrbuch dcr 
Geschichte dcr Philosophic, of the Geschichtc dcr Philosophic 
des Mittelaltcrs by the same author, of De Wulf’s Histoire de 
la philosophic nicdicvale, of Gonzalez’ Historia de la filosofia, 
and of Falckenberg’s and Hoffding’s histories of modern 
philosophy, indicates the principal secondary sources which 
have been used, but does not represent the full extent of the 
writer’s indebtedness to those works. In revising the 
manuscript and in reading the proofs use has been made of 
the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology edited by 
Professor J. M. Baldwin.
PREFACE V
The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the 
Rev. J. M. Prendergast, S.J., of Holy Cross College, Worcester, 
to the Rev. J. M. Reardon of the St. Paul Seminary, and to the 
Rev. T. E. Judge for many helpful suggestions in the course 
of their revision of some of the proofs. He is, moreover, 
indebted in a special manner to the Rev. H. Moynihan, 
S.T.I)., of the St. Paul Seminary, for careful and scholarly 
reading of all the proofs, and to Professor Frank Thilly, Ph.D., 
of the University of Missouri, whose valuable criticisms and 
suggestions have been the more appreciated because they 
come from one whose view point is so different from that of 
the writer. He gratefully acknowledges also the care and 
accuracy of the proof readers of the Athenaeum Press.
WILLIAM TURNER.
ST. PAUL, April 7, 1903.
CO N T EN TS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION : Definition, Method, Sources, Division of the 
History
of    
Philosophy    . . . . . . . . . .   
  i
PART I
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
SECTION A — ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY Babylonia and 
Assyria . . . . . . . . .     7
Egypt............ 9
China    . . . . . . . . . . . .   
  12
India    . . . . . . . . . . . .    
 15
Persia............26
SECTION B— GREEK AND GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY FIRST 
PERIOD — PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER
I.    Earlier Ionian School:    Thales,    Anaximander,    
Anaximenes    .    34
II.    The Pythagorean 
School . . . . . . .     38
III.    The Eleatic School: Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno,
Melissus.........44
IV.    Later Ionian Philosophers: Heraclitus, Empedocles, 
Anax¬
agoras ..........53
V.    The Atomists: Leucippus, Democritus . . . .  
   65
VI.    The Sophists: Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus . .  
  70
SECOND PERIOD — SOCRATES AND THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS
VII.    Socrates    . . . . . . . . . .   
  77
VIII.    The Imperfectly Socratic    Schools:    The    Megarian    
School,
The Elean    School, The Cynics, The Hedonists ...    84
IX.    Plato    . . . . . . . . . .     
93
X.    The Platonic Schools: Old, Middle, and New 
Academies .    121
XI.    
Aristotle    . . . . . . . . . .     
124
XII.    The Peripatetic School........158
viii CONTENTS
THIRD PERIOD — POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER    PAGE
XIII.    The    Stoics    . . . . . . . .     163
XIV.    The    Epicureans........175
XV. The Sceptics: Pyrrho, The Middle Academy, The Later
Sceptics    . . . . . . . .     184
XVI. The Eclectics .    .    .    .    .    .    .    . 1 8 7
XVII.    The    Scientific    Movement . . . . . .     188
XVIII. Philosophy of the Romans: Cicero . . . .     189
Character of Greek Philosophy .    .    .    .    194
SECTION C— GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY
XIX. Greco- Jewish Philosophy: Aristobulus, Philo    .    . 200
XX.    Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism    .    .    .    204
PART I I
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA
INTRODUCTION..........215
SECTION A — PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY
XXL Heretical Systems : Gnosticism, Manicheism .    .    . 218
XXII.    Ante-Nicene Fathers: Clement, Origen    .    .    .    220
XXIII.    Post-Nicene Fathers: Pseudo-Dionysius, St. John of
Damascus, St. Augustine . . . . . .     222
SECTION B—SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY FIRST PERIOD 
OF SCHOLASTICISM: ERIGENA TO ROSCELIN
XXIV.    First Masters of the Schools: Alcuin, Fredegis, Rha-
banus Maurus . . . . . . .     244
XXV. John Scotus Erigena.......246
XXVI. Gerbert.........257
XXVII. The School of Auxerre : Eric, Remi, Author of Glosses .    261
SECOND PERIOD OF SCHOLASTICISM : 
ROSCELIN TO ALEXANDER OF HALES
XXVIII. Predecessors of Roscelin . . . . . .     268
XXIX. Roscelin.........269
XXX. St. Anselm........272
XXXI, William of Champeaux, The Indifferentists: Otto of
Tournai, Adelard of Bath, Walter of Mortagne .    * 2 7 9
CONTENTS lx
CHAPTEK    PAGE
XXXII.    Abelard.........285
XXXIII.    The School of Chartres: Bernard and Theodoric of
Chartres, William of Conches, Gilbert de la Porree . 
   292
XXXIV.    Eclectics : John of Salisbury, Peter the Lombard, 
Alanus
of Lille, Gerard    of 
Cremona    . . . . .     299
XXXV. The Mystic School: St. Bernard ; Hugh, Richard, and
Walter, of St. 
Victor . . . . . . .     302
XXTXHVIRI.D T hPeE RPaIOnDth eOiFst SicC SHcOhLoAoSl T: IBCeIrSnMa r:d  AoLf ETXoAurNsD, EARm aOuFr y of
Bene, DaHvAidL EoSf   T  OD iOnCanKtA..M....306
XXXVII. PredeBceyszsaonrtsin eo,f  ASrat.b iTahno, manads: J eSwimisohn P hoiflo sToopurhnya .i ,    .    
Ale3x1a0nder Neckam, Alfred Sereshel, William 
of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, John de la 
Rveonchtuerlele, ,R Sotg. eBro Bnaa-con, Albert the Great .    .    .    
324
XXXVIII.    St. Thomas of Aquin......343
XXXIX. Thomists and Anti-Thomists .    .    .    .    .    . 3 8 1
XL.    Henry of Ghent . . . . . . .     
3S4
XLI.    John Duns Scotus........387
XLII. Averroism in the Schools: Siger of Brabant, Boetius the
Dacian, Bernier of Nivelles, Raymond Lully .    .    
393
FOURTH PERIOD OF SCHOLASTICISM : BIRTH OF OCKAM TO 
TAKING OF CONSTANTINOPLE
XLI II.    Predecessors of Ockam : Durandus, 
Aureolus    .    .    400
XLIV.    William of Ockam.......404
XLV. Followers and Opponents of Ockam: John Buridan,
Peter d’Ailly, Raymond of Sabunde, etc. .    .    .    
408
XLVI. The Mystic School: Orthodox Mystics, Heterodox
SECTION C— MODERN PHILOSOPHY
Mystics .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    411
XLVFIIIR. S  T N PicEhRoIlOasD  o—f  ATuRtAreNcSoIuTrItO..N.. .F..R4O15M SCHOLASTIC TO 
CharacMteOr DoEfR SNc hPoHlaILsOtiSc OPPhHilYosophy .    .    .    
XLVIII. Schola4s1ti7cs of the Transition Period: Cajetan. Suarez, 
etc. 424 XLIX. The Humanists : Pletho, Bessarion, Valla, 
etc, ,    .    425
X CONTENTS
CHAPTER    PAGK
L. Italian Philosophy of Nature: Cardano, Telesio, Bruno,
Cainpanella . . . . . . . .  
   428
LI. The Scientific Movement: Copernicus, 
Kepler,Galileo, etc. 432 LII. Protestant Mysticism : 
Luther, Zwingli, Bohme, etc. .    438
LIII. Systems of Political Philosophy: Machiavelli, More,
Bodin, 
Hobbes . . . . . . . .     
441
SECOND PERIOD—FROM DESCARTES TO KANT LIY. 
Descartes . . . . . . . . .     
447
LV. Cartesianism : Pascal, Geulincx, Malebranche .    .    
462
LV1. Spinoza . . . . . . . . .     
466
LVII. English Empiricism: Cocke, Newton, The Deistic 
Controversy . . . . . . . .
.     486
LVII I. British 
Moralists . . . . . . . .     495
LIX. French Empiricism . . . . . . .    
 500
LX. The Idealistic Movement: Leibniz, Berkeley .    . 505
LXI. Pan-Phenomenalism — Hume . . . . .  
   518
LXII. German Illumination — Transition to Kant .    .    . 
524
THIRD PERIOD — FROM KANT TO OUR OWN TIME 
LXIII. German Philosophy: Kant . . . . .     
528
LXIV. German Philosophy (continued): The Kantians, The
Romantic Movement, Fichte, Schelling    .    .    .  
  54.8
LXV. German Philosophy (continued): Hegel, The 
Hegelians 560 LXVI. German Philosophy (continued): The 
Reaction against
Hegel ; Herbart, 
Schopenhauer . . . .     583
LXVII.    The Scottish School: Reid, Brown, Stewart,    etc.  
  .    .    592
LXVIII. French Philosophy: The Traditionalists, The Eclectics,
The Positivists, The 
Sociologists . . . .     602
LXIX. English Philosophy: The Association School, 
Utilitarianism, Evolution, Idealism .    .    .    .    
- 6 1 3
LXX. Italian Philosophy : Vico, Galuppi, Rosmini, Gioberti, 
etc. 630 LXXI. American Philosophy: Edwards, McCosh, 
Brownson, etc. 634 LXXII. Catholic Philosophy in the 
Nineteenth Century: The
Neo-Scholastic Movement .    .    .    .    .    637
LXXIII. Contemporary Philosophy in Germany, France, 
England,
Italy, America........644
LXXIV. Conclusion........653
INDEX ............661
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
THE History of Philosophy is the exposition of 
philosophical opinions and of systems and schools of 
philosophy. It includes the study of the lives of philosophers, 
the inquiry into the mutual connection of schools and 
systems of thought, and the attempt to trace the course of 
philosophical progress or retrogression.
The nature and scope of philosophy furnish reasons for 
the study of its history. Philosophy does not confine its 
investigation to one or to several departments of knowledge 
; it is concerned with the ultimate principles and laws of all 
things. Every science has f6r its aim to find the causes of 
phenomena ; philosophy seeks to discover ultimate causes, 
thus carrying to a higher plane the unifying process begun in 
the lower sciences. The vastness of the field of inquiry, the 
difficulty of synthesizing the results of scientific 
investigation, and the constantly increasing complexity of 
these results necessitated the gradual development of 
philosophy. To each generation and to each individual the 
problems of philosophy present themselves anew, and the 
influences, personal, racial, climatic, social, and religious, 
which bear on the generation or on the individual must be 
studied in order that the meaning and value of each doctrine 
and system be understood and appreciated. Such influences 
are more than a matter of mere erudition ; they have their 
place in the pnenotanda to the solution of every important 
question
I
2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
in philosophy ; for, as Coleridge says, “ the very fact that any 
doctrine has been believed by thoughtful men is part of the 
problem to be solved, is one of the phenomena to be 
accounted for.” Moreover, philosophical doctrines, while they 
are to be regarded primarily as contributions to truth, are 
also to be studied as vital forces which have determined to a 
large extent the literary, artistic, political, and industrial life 
of the world. To-day, more than ever, it is clearly understood 
that without a knowledge of these forces it is impossible to 
comprehend the inner movements of thought which alone 
explain the outer actions of men and nations.
The dangers to be avoided in the study of the history of 
philosophy are Eclecticism, which teaches that all systems 
are equally true, and Scepticism, which teaches that all 
systems are equally false. A careful study of the course of 
philosophical speculation will result in the conviction that, 
while no single school can lay claim to the entire truth, 
certain schools of thought have adopted that world-concept 
which can be most consistently applied to every department 
of knowledge. False systems of philosophy may stumble on 
many important truths, but a right concept of the ultimate 
meaning of reality and a correct notion of philosophic 
method are the essentials for which we must look in every 
system ; these constitute a legitimate standard of valuation 
by which the student of the history of philosophy may judge 
each successive contribution to philosophical science.
The method to be followed in this study is the empirical, 
or a posteriori, method, which is employed in all historical 
research. The speculative, or a priori, method consists in 
laying down a principle, such as the Hegelian principle that 
the succession of schools and systems corresponds to the 
succession of logical categories, and deducing from such a 
principle the actual succession of schools and systems. But, 
apart from the danger of misstating facts for the sake of 
methodic symmetry, such a
INTRODUCTION
o
procedure must be judged to be philosophically unsound ; 
for systems of philosophy, like facts of general history, are 
contingent events. There are, indeed, laws of historical 
development ; but such laws are to be established 
subsequently, not anteriorly, to the study of the facts of 
history.
The historian of philosophy, therefore, has for his task : (i) 
To set forth the lives and doctrines of philosophers and 
systems and schools of philosophy in their historical relation. 
This, the recitative or narrative portion of the historian’s 
task, includes the critical examination of sources. (2) To 
trace the genetic connection between systems, schools, and 
doctrines, and to estimate the value of each successive 
contribution to philosophy. This, the philosophical portion of 
the historian’s task, is by far the most important of his 
duties : Potius de rebus ipsis jadicare debemus, quam pro 
magno de hominibns quid quisque senscrit scire}
The sources of the history of philosophy are: (1) Primary 
sources, namely, the works, complete or fragmentary, of 
philosophers. It is part of the historian’s task to establish, 
whenever necessary, the authenticity and integrity of these 
works.
(2) Secondary sources, that is, the narration or testimony of 
other persons concerning the lives, opinions, and doctrines 
of philosophers. In dealing with secondary sources the rules 
of historical criticism must be applied, in order to determine 
the reliability of witnesses.
The division of the history of philosophy will always be 
more or less arbitrary in matters of detail. This is owing to 
the continuity of historical development : the stream of 
human thought flows continuously from one generation to 
another ; like all human institutions, systems and schools of 
philosophy never break entirely with the past; they arise and 
succeed one another without abrupt transition and merge 
into one another so imperceptibly that it is rarely possible to 
decide where one ends and
1 St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX, 3.
4 HISTORY OF PHI I.OSOPi I\
another begins. The more general divisions, however, are 
determined by great historical events and by obvious 
national and geographical distinctions. Thus, the coming of 
Christ divides the History of Philosophy into two parts, each 
of which may be subdivided as follows :
PART I —ANCIENT OR PRE-CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
SECTION A — ORIENTAL OR PRE-HELLENIC PHILOSOPHY 
SECTION E— GREEK AND GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 
SECTION C — GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY
PART II —PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA
SECTION A — PATRISTIC 
PHILOSOPHY SECTION E — 
SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 
SECTION C — MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY
General Bibliography. — The following works treat of the History of 
Philosophy as a whole: Erdmann, History of Philosophy, trans. by Hough (3 
vols., London, 1890) ; Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, trans. by Morris (2 
vols., New York, 1872); Weber, History of Philosophy, trans. by Thilly (New 
York, 1896); Windelband, History of Philosophy, trans. by Tufts (second 
edition, New York, 1901); Stdckl, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie 
(2 Bde., 3. Aufl., Mainz, 1888), trans. in part from the second edition by 
Finlay (Dublin, 1887).
For the history of parts of philosophy, consult Prantl, Geschichte der 
Logik im Abendlatide (4 Bde., Leipzig, 1855 ff.) ; Siebeck, Geschichte der 
Psychologie (Gotha, 1880-18S4) ; Sidgwick, History of Ethics (third edition, 
London, 1S92); Bosanquet, History of ^Esthetics (London, 1892).
Consult also Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus (3 Bde., 
Braunschweig, 18941897), and Lange, History of Materialism, trans. by 
Thomas (3 vols., London, 1878-1881).
For complete bibliography, cf. Weber, op. cit., pp. 13 ff.
PART  I
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
SECTION A
ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY
IN the doctrines by means of which the Babylonians, 
Chinese, Hindus, Egyptians, and other Oriental peoples 
sought to formulate their thoughts concerning the origin of 
the universe and the nature and destiny of man, the 
religious element predominates over the natural or rational 
explanation. An adequate account of these doctrines 
belongs, therefore, to the History of Religions rather than to 
the History of Philosophy. While, however, this is so, and 
while the task of separating the religious from the 
philosophical element of thought in the Oriental systems of 
speculation is by no means easy, some account of these 
systems must be given before we pass to the study of 
Western thought.
Sources. The most important collection of primary sources is 
The Sacred Books of the East, edited by Max Muller (Oxford, 1879 
ff-)- For a complete list of secondary sources and recent 
studies on the religious systems of the East, consult Lehrbuch 
der Religionsgeschichte, von P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Bd. II 
(2. Aufl., Freiburg im B., 1S97). Consult also Ueberweg, History 
of Philosophy, trans. by Morris (New York, 1872), Vol. I, pp. 15, 
16. BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA
1
When, probably about the year 3800 B.C., the Semites 
conquered Babylonia, they found there a civilization which 
is
1 For bibliography, cf. De la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der 
Religionsgeschichte, I, 163; cf. also Manual of the Science of Religion, by 
De la Saussaye, trans. by B. Colyer Ferguson (London, 1S91), pp. 45S ff. 
The latter is a translation of the first volume of the first edition of the 
Lehrbuch.
To De la Saussaye’s list add Jastrow, The Religion of Assyria and 
7
Babylonia (Boston, 1S9S).
8 H1ST0RV OF PHILOSOPHY
commonly called that of the Aecadians and Sumerians, and is 
by many regarded as the source of all the civilizations of the 
East. The religion of the Aceadians was originally 
Shamanistie : every object, every force in nature, was 
believed to possess a spirit (Zi) who could be controlled by 
the magical exorcisms of the Shaman, or sorcerer-priest.1 
Gradually certain of these spirits had been elevated to the 
dignity of gods, as, for instance, Ann (the sky), Mul-gc, or 
Enum (the earth), and Hca (the deep). It was not, however, 
until the time of Assurbanipal (seventh century B.C.) that this 
primitive system of theogony began to develop into a system 
of cosmogony based on the idea that the universe arose out 
of a chaos of waters. Before that time, there prevailed in 
Accadia a vague traditional belief that the present cosmic 
system was preceded by an anarchical chaos in which there 
existed composite creatures,—men with the bodies of birds 
and the tails of fishes,—Nature’s first attempts at creation. 
With this creationist legend was associated an equally vague 
belief in a gloomy Hades, or underworld, where the spirits of 
the dead hover like bats and feed on dust.
From the earliest times the Aecadians devoted attention 
to the observation of the heavenly bodies, and it may be said 
that among them Astronomy found its first home. Their crude 
attempts at astronomical observations were, however, 
connected with astrological practices, so that the Chaldeeans 
became famous among the ancients as adepts in the magic 
arts : Chctldceos ne consulito. In like manner, the first efforts 
at numerical computation and notation were made 
subservient to the demands of the magician.
It was through the Phoenicians, who inaugurated the trade 
of western Asia, that the civilization of the Assyrians 
influenced the religious and artistic life of the Greeks and of 
the other nations of the Mediterranean.
1 Cf Sayce, The Ancient Empires of the East (New York, 1S96), pp. 145 ff.
Kr.YIT 9
EGYPT 1
Up to the present time Egyptologists have failed to reach 
an agreement as to what was the primitive form of religious 
belief in ancient Egypt. In the first place, the chronological 
difficulties have hitherto proved to be insurmountable ; and 
in the next place, the diversity of religious systems in the 
different nomcs, or provinces, into which ancient Egypt was 
divided, renders difficult every attempt at forming a theory 
as to what, if any, was the one religion which prevailed 
throughout Egypt at the dawn of history. Historians are 
content with dating the period preceding the seventh 
century B.C. by dynasties rather than by years, the first 
dynasty being placed about the fifty-fifth century B.C. Menes, 
who established the first dynasty, found already existing a 
hierarchical system of deities, to each of whom some great 
city was dedicated. But what was the primitive religion of 
Egypt, from which this hierarchical system of gods was 
evolved ? Monotheism, Polytheism, Pantheism, Hcnothcism, 
Totcmism, Sun-Worship, Nature-Worship,—these are the 
widely different answers which modern Egyptologists have 
given to this question.2 Scholars are equally at variance as 
to the origin and significance of Animal-Uorsltip among the 
Egyptians. When, however, we come to the period of the 
great gods, chief of whom were Pa (the sun), Nut (heaven), 
and Set, or Typhon (the earth), and to the legends of Osiris, 
Isis, and Horns, there seems to be very little room for doubt 
as to the essentially naturalistic character of these 
divinities. “The kernel of the Egyptian state religion was 
solar.”3
With regard to the speculative elements of thought 
con1 t  a Finore bdib ilnio gtrhaeph my, ycft.h Doel olag Sicaausl scaoven,c oef.p (titi.o, nI, sS So. fa nthd eth eE gMyapnutiaal ns, 
mabeovnet iroenfe rmredu stot, pp. 374 ff.2    Cf. De la Saussaye, Manual, p. 396.
3    Sayce, The Ancient Empires of the East, p. 5S.
IO HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
be made of the doctrine that everything living, whether it 
was a god, a man, or an animal, possessed a Ka, or 
“shadow,” which was in each case more real and permanent 
than the object itself. This notion was present in the practice 
of animal worship; for, although there is by no means a 
unanimity of opinion among scholars in favor of reducing 
animal worship to mere symbolism, there is no doubt that 
the Egyptian mind was dominated by the idea that every Ka 
must have a material dwelling place. Similarly, when the 
abstract notion of the divinity presented itself to the 
Egyptian mind and was identified with each god in turn, and 
when, at a later time, there appeared the notion of a 
pantheistic divinity in whom all the great gods were merged, 
the dominant idea was always that of the Ka or soul, whose 
dwelling place was the individual god or the universe. 
Another conception which may be traced very far back in the 
history of Egyptian civilization is that of the magical virtue of 
names.
The idea of “shadow” and the belief in the magical virtue 
of names determined the Egyptian cult of the dead and the 
doctrine of immortality. From the monuments and the relics 
of ancient Egyptian literature, especially from the Book of 
the Dead} it is clear that deep down in the popular mind was 
the belief that the continued existence of a person after 
death depended somehow on the preservation of his name 
and on the permanence of the dwelling place which was to 
harbor his Ka, or shadow. Hence, the Egyptians considered 
that the houses of the living were merely inns, and that the 
tombs of the dead are eternal habitations. In the 
philosophical traditions of the priestly caste there grew up a 
more rational doctrine of the future life. According to this 
doctrine, man consists of three parts, the Khat, or body, the 
KJiu, or spirit, which is an emanation from the divine 
essence, and the soul, which is sometimes represented as a 
Ka dwelling in the mummy or in the statue of the deceased,
1 For texts, date, etc., rf. Wiedemann, Religion of the Ancient Egyptians 
(New York, 1S97), p. 244.
IT ATT I I
and sometimes as a Ba, or disembodied soul, which 
ultimately returns to its home in the lower world.1 It is this 
Ba, or disembodied soul, which after death appears before 
Osiris and the forty-two judges, and is weighed in the 
balance by Horus and Anubis while Thoth records the result. 
The souls of the blessed are eventually admitted to the 
happy fields of Aalu, there to be purified from all earthly 
stain and made more perfect in wisdom and goodness. The 
souls of the wicked are condemned either to the various 
torments of hell, or to wanderings long and arduous 
through the regions between heaven and earth, or to 
transmigration into the bodies of various animals, or, 
finally, to annihilation. The fate of the soul is determined 
partly by the good and evil which it wrought during life and 
partly by the amulets, prayers, and gifts by which it secured 
the favor of the gods. But whatever may be the immediate 
fate of the soul, it will ultimately return to its body, and on 
the great day of resurrection soul, body, and spirit shall be 
oncFer ommo rteh eu ncihteadp.ter on Judgment in the Book of the Dead 
and from the Ethical Maxims of Kakimma (third dynasty) 
and Ptah-hotcp (fifth dynasty) it appears that the ideal of 
conduct among the ancient Egyptians was practical, of a 
high order of purity, and essentially religious. In these 
documents charity, benevolence, prudence, chastity, social 
justice, clemency, and the love of intellectual pursuits are 
ranked among the foremost virtues. And not only external 
morality is inculcated but also the morality of thought and 
desire.
1 Mention is also made of Osin's, or that part of man’s immortal nature 
which has such close resemblance to the god Osiris as to be called by his 
name. Wiedemann (op. cit., p. 244) maintains that in the different 
designations, A 'a, etc., we have to do with different conceptions of an 
immortal soul, which had arisen in separate places in prehistoric times and 
were ultimately combined into one doctrine, “ the Egyptians not daring to 
set any aside for fear it should prove to be the true one.”
CHINA 1
When, about 2000 years J;.C., the Chinese first appeared 
in the light of history, they already possessed social, 
political, and religious institutions and a material and 
intellectual civilization of a high order. It was not, however, 
until the sixth century B.C. that the sacred books were 
collected and arranged, although some of them, especially 
the Y-kittg, were assigned by tradition to the learned princes 
and kings who, long before the historical period, had 
invented the art of writing. The sacred or authoritative books 
were :
I.    The Five Classics, namely, the Y-kittg, or Book of 
Changes (divination) ; the SJtu-king, or Book of History ; the 
S/ii-kiuA or Book of Poetry; the Le-kc, or Record of Rites; and 
the Chun-tscw, Spring and Autumn, a Book of Annals, 
composed by Confucius.
II.    The Four Books, namely, Lun-yu, or Conversations of 
the Master ; Chunyung, or Doctrine of the Mean ; Ta-hco, or 
Great Learning ; and Mcng-tsc, or Teachings of Mencius.
The Five Classics were collected, arranged, and edited by 
Confucius (with the exception of the last, which was written 
by him), and it is impossible to say to what extent the editor 
introduced into the text doctrines and opinions of his own. 
The Four Books were composed by disciples of Confucius.
Before the time of Confucius there existed a national or 
state religion in which the principal objects of worship were 
heaven, and spirits of various kinds, especially the spirits of 
dead ancestors. 11 eaven (T/iiau) is the supreme lord 
(Shang-ti), the highest object of worship.2 The deity carries 
on its work
1    Cf. translations of Chinese Classics by Dr. Legge, in Sacred Books of 
the East, Yols. Ill, XVI, XXVII, XXVIII. For bibliography, cf. I)e la Saussaye, 
Lehrbttch, I, 50. Consult also R. K. Douglas, Confucianism and Taouism 
(London, 1879).
2    According to Mgr. De Ilarlez, “there is every reason for affirming that 
Shang-ti is not identical with Heaven, is not Heaven animized, but a 
personal being, the supreme Spirit governing the world from the height of 
the empyrean.” ATew 11 odd (December, 1S9 3), Vol. II, p. 652.
( 'HINA 1 3
silently and simply, yet inexorably, in the order and 
succession of natural phenomena, in the rain and the 
sunshine, the heat and the cold, etc. With this natural order 
are closely connected the social, political, and moral orders 
of the world ; or rather, all order is essentially one, and 
perfection and prosperity in moral life and in the state 
depend on maintaining the order which is not only heaven’s 
first law, but heaven itself. With the worship of heaven was 
connected the worship of spirits (Shan). These are 
omnipresent throughout nature ; they are not, however, 
addressed as individuals, but as a body or aggregation of 
individuals, as, for example, celestial spirits, terrestrial 
spirits, and ancestral spirits. The last are the object of 
private as distinct from official worship. The Chinese, 
always inclined to look towards the past rather than 
towards the future, thought less of personal immortality in 
the life after death than of the continuation of the family 
life by which the actions of the individual were reflected 
bacTkh ea nqdu malaitdiees  tow ehnicnho bclhea ara wctheorlieze ldin eth oef  arenlcigeisotuosrs .thought 
of China from the beginning — its eminently practical 
nature, the complete absence of speculation, and the 
almost complete exclusion of mythological elements — 
reappear in the writings of the great religious teacher 
Confucius (Koug-tse, 551-478 B.C.). Confucius was no 
innovator ; he appeared, rather, as the collector of the 
sacred literature of the past and the restorer of the old 
order. He inculcated the strict observance of the traditional 
forms of worship, discouraged speculation in matters 
theological, and while he taught the supreme importance of 
moral duties, he grounded all his moral precepts on the 
general order of the world and the long-established 
tradition of the Chinese people. He insisted on man’s 
polLitaicoa-tls ea,n da  cdoonmteemstpico rdauryti eosf  aCnodn fuecmiupsh a(bsiozrend  aebsopuetc i6a0ll4y  
tBh.Ce. )i, mapnodr taauntcheo ro fo fif litahle p iTeatyo.-te-king, introduced into China 
the first
i 4 111 STORY OF PHILOSOPHY
system of speculative thought, the philosophy of Tao 
(Reason, Way), which many scholars consider to be of Hindu 
origin.1 Lao-tse did not, however, attempt to overthrow the 
traditional ideals of his countrymen, and, while the 
importance which he attaches to speculation places him in 
sharp contrast with Confucius, the doctrines of the two great 
teachers have many points in common. For Tao, the 
fundamental concept of the Tao-tc-king, does not mean 
Reason in the abstract, but Nature, or rather, the Way, — the 
order of the world, the impersonal method which all men 
must observe if they are to attain goodness and success. 
Ultimately, then, both Lao-tse and Confucius teach that 
conduct is to be guided by a knowledge of the unalterable, 
discriminating, intelligent order of heaven and earth ; but 
while Confucius refers his disciples to the study of the 
writings and institutions of antiquity, Lao-tse refers them to 
the speculative contemplation of Tao: the former encourages 
study, the latter advocates contemplation, as a means of 
acquiring a knowledge of the eternal order on which morality 
depends. Hence, the tendency of Taoism towards quietism 
and self-abnegation. “ Recompense injury with kindness,” 
said Lao-tse ; to which Confucius is said to have answered, “ 
Recompense kindness with kindness, but recompense injury 
with justice.”
To the fifth century B.C. belong Yang-tse and Mih-tse (or 
Mak). The former preached a kind of Epicureanism : man 
should enjoy the present and cheerfully accept death when it 
comes ; virtue is but a name ; good reputation is a shadow ; 
the sacrifice of self is a delusion. The latter maintained that 
one should love all men equally, that the practice of 
universal love is a greater benefit to the state than the study 
of antiquity and the preservation of ancient customs.2
Lih-tse and Chwang-tse appeared during the fifth and the 
first half of the fourth centuries B.C. as representatives of 
Taoism.
1    Cf. Douglas, op. cit., p. 219.
2    Cf. De la Saussaye, Manual, p. 367.
INDIA *5
They were opposed by the distinguished exponent of 
Confucianism, Meng-tse or Mencius (371-2S8). In his 
dialogues, which were collected in seven books by his 
disciples, he gives a more compact exposition of 
Confucianism than that found in the isolated sayings of the 
master. He insists on filial piety, on political virtue, and on 
the proper observance of religious and other ceremonial 
rites. He reduces the cardinal virtues to four : Wisdom, 
Humanity, Justice, and Propriety.
INDIA 1
The Veda, or collection of primitive religious literature of 
the Hindus, consists of books of sacred hymns, the Pig- 1  
Pda, the Sdma-W'da, the Vagur-JPda, and the AtJ/arra- 1  Pda. 
In each it is usual to distinguish the Mantras, or hymns, the 
Brdhmauas, or ritualistic commentaries, and the 
Upanishads, or philosophical commentaries.2
The Vedic hymns, which are the oldest portion of the 
Veda (1500 B.C. being the date to which conservative 
scholars assign the earliest of them), consist of songs of 
praise and prayer directed to Agni (fire), Soma (the life-
awakening, intoxicating juice of the soma-plant), Indra (the 
god of the wars of the elements, of thunder and rain), 
Varuna (the great, serene, allembracing heaven), and other 
deities, all of whom possess more or less definitely the 
twofold character of gods of nature and gods of sacrifice. 
The gods of the Vedic hymns are styled Devas (shining 
divinities) and Asitras (lords). There is, in the poems, no 
evidence of a sustained attempt to trace the genealogy of 
these deities or to account by means of mythological 
concepts for the origin of the universe.
1    For bibliography, cf. De la Saussaye, LcJirbuch, II, 4, and Manual, p. 
497. Consult Max Miiller, Tin’ Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (London, 
1S99), and Deussen, Das System des Vedanta (1SS3), and Allg. Gesch. der 
Phil2o  s  oCpfh. iHeo (p1k8i9n9s,) .The Religions of India (Boston, 1S9S), pp. 7 ff.
1(> HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Brd/imanas, or ritualistic commentaries, appears 
the concept of a god distinct from the elemental deities, a 
personification of the act of sacrifice,—BraJimanaspati. From 
this concept the monotheistic and pantheistic speculation of 
the Hindus may be said to have started, although it is 
undeniable that even in the hymns there is expressed at 
least “ a yearning after one supreme deity, who made the 
heaven and the earth, the sea and all that in them is,” — a 
yearning to which expression was given in the name 
Pragapati (the lord of all creatures), applied successively to 
Soma and other divinities. Of more importance, however, 
than the name Pragapati is the expression Tad Ekam (that 
One) which occurs in the poems as the name of the Supreme 
Being, of the First Origin of all things. Its neuter form 
indicates, according to Max Muller, a transition from the 
mythological to the metaphysical stage of speculation. With 
regard to the word Brahman which succeeded Tad Ekam as 
the name of the Supreme One, Max Muller refers it to the 
root brih (to grow) and asserts that while the word 
undoubtedly meant prayer, it originally meant “that which 
breaks forth.” It “ was used as a name of that universal force 
which manifests itself in the creation of a visible universe.” 1 
The word Atman, which was also a name of the deity, is 
referred by the same distinguished scholar to the root dtma 
(breath, life, soul) and is translated as Self. There grew up, 
he says, in the hymns and Brahmanas of the Veda the three 
words Pragapati, Brahman, and Atman, “each of which by 
itself represents in mice a whole philosophy, or a view of the 
world. A belief in Pragapati, as a personal god, was the 
beginning of monotheistic religion in India, while the 
recognition of Brahman and Atman, as one, constituted the 
foundation of all the monistic philosophy of that country.”2
In the Epanishads, or speculative commentaries, we find 
the first elaborate attempts made Bylndia to formulate a 
1 S/x Systems, p. 60.    2 Op. cit., pp. 95, 96.
speculative
INDIA 17
system of the universe and to solve in terms of philosophy 
the problems of the origin of the universe and of the nature 
and destiny of man. It must, however, be remembered that 
probably until the fourth century B.C. the Upanishads, in 
common with the other portions of the Veda, did not exist in 
writing, being handed down from one generation to another 
by oral tradition. The Sutras, oiyaphorisms, therefore, which 
we possess of the six systems of Indian philosophy do not 
represent the first attempts at philosophical speculation. 
The men whose names are associated with these Sutras, 
and are used to designate the six systems, are not, in any 
true sense, the founders of schools of philosophy : they are 
merely final editors or redactors of the Sutras belonging to 
different philosophical sects, which, in the midst of a variety 
of theories, and in a maze of speculative opinions, retained 
their individuality during an inconceivably long period of 
time.
Before we take up the separate study of the six systems 
of philosophy it will be necessary to outline the general 
teaching of the Upanishads. This teaching belongs to no 
school in particular, although each of the six schools is 
connected with it in more than one point of doctrine. The 
Upanishads teach :
1.    The identity of all being in Brahman, the Source, or 
Atman, the Self, which is identical with Brahman.
2.    The existence of may a (illusion), to which is referred 
''everything which is not Brahman.
3.    The worthlessness of all knowledge of things in 
their ..-isolated existence, and the incomparable excellence 
of the
knozvledge of all things in Brahmati or Atman. This latter, 
the only true knowledge, is difficult of attainment; still it is 
attainable even in this life. It is this knowledge which 
constitutes the happiness of man by uniting him with 
Atman. “ In the bee’s honey one can no longer recognize 
the taste of the single flowers ; the rivers which emanate 
from the one sea and again return to it lose meanwhile their 
separate existences ;
18 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
a lump of salt dissolved in water salts the whole water and 
cannot be grasped again : so the true being can nowhere be 
grasped. It is a subtle essence which lies at the foundation 
of all phenomena, which are merely illusions, and is again 
identical with the ego." 1
4.    The i)nmortality of the soul. “.The idea,” writes Max 
Muller, “of the soul ever coming to an end is so strange to 
the Indian mind that there seemed to be no necessity for 
anything like proofs of immortality, so common in European 
philosophy.”2 Equally self-evident to the Hindu mind was the 
samsdm, or transmigration of the soul. In some systems, 
however, as we shall see, it is the subtle body which 
migrates, while, during the process of migration, the soul, in 
the sense of self, retaining its complete identity, remains as 
an onlooker.
With the idea of immortality is associated that of the 
eternity of kannan (deed), namely, the continuous working 
of every thought, word, and deed through all ages. If a man 
were, once in a thousand years, to pass his silken 
handkerchief across the Himalayan mountains and thus at 
last succeed in wiping them out, the world would* indeed, 
be older at the end of such a long space of time, but eternity 
and reality would still be young, and the deed of to-day 
would still exist in its results. At a late period in the 
development of Vedic speculation the immensity of the 
duration of Brahman was given popular expression in the 
doctrine of kalpas (a:ons), or periods of reabsorption 
(pralaya) and creation.
5.    Mysticism and deliverance from bondage. All the •' 
Indian systems of philosophy recognize the existence of evil
and suffering and concern themselves with the problem of 
deliverance by means of knowledge. From the rise of 
Buddhism (fifth century u.c.) date a clearer perception of the 
reality of suffering and a more emphatic assertion of the
1 De la Saussaye, Ahmual. p. 53S ; cf. Khamtogya UpanishaJ, trans. in 
S.B.E., Vul. I, pp! 92 ff .    - Op. cit., p. 143.
INDIA 19
importance of freeing the soul from the bondage which 
suffering imposes. It is to be remarked that, even in the 
Upan-ishads, existence is referred to as an evil, 
transmigration is represented as something to be avoided, 
and the final goal of human endeavor is proclaimed to be a 
union with Atman, in which all individual existence is 
merged in the general Self, and individual consciousness is 
quite extinguished.
Turning now to the six great historical systems of Indian 
philosophy, we meet at the very outset the vexed question 
of chronological order.    Many of the Sutras, or aphorisms, 
in
which these systems are formulated are of very great 
antiquity, ranking with the Upanishads in point of age. 
Besides, the authors of these Sutras are more or less 
vaguely historical or altogether mythical persons.    It is 
hopeless, therefore, to
attempt to arrange the systems in chronological order. The 
order followed will represent rather the fidelity with which 
the systems (all of which were considered orthodox) adhere 
to the doctrines described as the common teaching of the 
Upanishads.
I. The Vedanta, or Uttam-AIimamsd9 is first in importance 
among the systematic expositions of the philosophical 
teachings of the Upanishads. It is contained in Sutras 
composed by Badarayana, who is sometimes identified with 
Vyasa, the author of the Mahdbharata (one of the great 
epics of India), and in commentaries composed by Samkara 
(about A.n. 900).
The fundamental doctrines of the Vedanta are those of 
the Upanishads. The Vedanta insists on the monistic 
concept of reality: “ In one half verse I shall tell you what 
has been taught in thousands of volumes : Brahman is true, 
the world
1 Mimamsd means investigation. The Uttar a-Mini a m s a (later 
investigation) is so called because it is regarded by the Hindus as later 
than the Piirva-Mhnamsa, ox prior investigation. The designations are 
maintained even by those who do not admit the posteriority of date, since 
the Purva-Mimamsa refers to the first, or practical, while the Uttara-
Mimamsd refers to the second, or speculative, portion of the Veda.
20 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing else.” “There is 
nothing worth gaining, there is nothing worth enjoying, 
there is nothing worth knowing but Brahman alone, for he 
who knows Brahman is Brahman.”1 More emphatically still is 
the unity of all being in Brahman asserted in the famous 
words Tat tv am asi (Thou art that), which Max Muller styles 
“the boldest and truest synthesis in the whole history of 
philosophy.” But, if the individual is Brahman, how are we to 
account for the manifold “thous” and for the variety of 
individuals in the objective world? The Vedanta-Sutras 
answer that the view of the world as composed of manifold 
individuals is not knowledge but nescience, which the 
Vedanta philosophy aims at expelling from the mind. This 
nescience (avidyd) is inborn in human nature, and it is only 
when it is expelled that the mind perceives Brahman to be 
the only reality. Samkara, the commentator, admits, 
however, that the phenomenal world, the whole objective 
world as distinct from the subject (Brahman), while it is the 
result of nescience, is nevertheless real for all practical 
purposes. Moreover, it is clear that phenomena, since they 
are Brahman, are real : only the multiplicity and distinction 
of phenomena are unreal (maya).
With regard to the origin of the universe: the universe, 
since it is Brahman, cannot be said to originate. And yet 
Brahman is commonly represented as the cause of the 
universe. The Hindus, however, regarded cause and effect 
as merely two aspects of the same reality: the threads, they 
observed, are the cause of the cloth, yet what is the cloth 
but the aggregate of threads ?2
Since the finiteness and individual distinctions of things 
are due to nescience, it is clear that the road to true 
freedom (moksiia) from the conditions of finite existence is 
the way of knowledge. The knowledge of the identity of 
Atman with
1 Quoted by Max Muller, Six Systems, pp. 159, 160.
- (f W’danta-Sutras, II, 1, 15; S.B.E., XXXIY, p. 331.
INDIA 2 1
Brahman, of Self with God, is true freedom and implies 
exemption from birth and transmigration. For, when death 
comes, he who, although he has fulfilled all his religious 
duties, shall have failed to attain the highest knowledge, 
shall be condemned to another round of existence. The 
subtle body, in which his soul (dtman) is clothed, shall 
wander through mist and cloud and darkness to the moon 
and thence shall be sent back to earth. But he who shall 
have attained perfect knowledge of Brahman shall finally 
become identified with Brahman, sharing in all the powers 
of Brahman except those of creating and ruling the 
universe. Partial freedom from finite conditions is, even in 
this life, a reward of perfect knowledge. The Vedan-tists, 
however, did not neglect the inculcation of moral 
excellence ; for knowledge, they taught, is not to be 
attaII.in e d  e xTcheep t Pbiyir vdais-cMipimlinaem. sa is a system of practical 
philosophy and is contained in twelve books of Sutras 
attributed to Gaimini. Here the central idea is that of duty 
(Dharma), which includes sacrificial observances and rests 
ultimately on the superhuman authority of the Veda.
III.    The Sdmkhya philosophy may be described as a 
toning down of the extreme monism of the Vedanta. It is 
contained in the Sdmkhya-Sutras or Kapila-Sutras. These, at 
least in their present form, date from the fourteenth 
century after Christ, although the sage, Kapila, to whom 
they are ascribed lived certainly before the second century 
B.C. Of greater antiquity than the Sutras are the Sdmkhya-
Kdrikas, or memorial verses, in which the philosophy of 
Kapila was epitomized as early as the first century B.C. A 
still older and more concise compilation of the Samkhya 
philosophy is found in the Tattva-Samdsa, which reduces all 
truth to twenty-five topics. This latter compendium is taken 
by Max Midler as the basis of his exposition of the teachings 
of Kapila.1 1 Six Systems, pp. 31S ff.
2 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
The Samkhya philosophy is essentially dualistic. It does 
not, like the Vedanta, assume that the objective world, as 
distinct from Brahman, is mere illusion or ignorance ; it 
accepts the objective world as real and calls it pmkriti, or 
nature in the sense of matter-containing-the-possibilities-of-
all-things. This principle is of itself lifeless and unconscious, 
and rises into life and consciousness only when 
contemplated by the soul {puntsha). What we call creation 
is, therefore, the temporary union of nature with soul,—-a 
union which arises from a lack of discrimination. How then is 
the soul to be freed from the bondage of finite existence ? 
This is for the Samkhya, as it was for the Vedanta, the chief 
problem of practical philosophy. But, while the Vedanta found 
deliverance in the recognition of the identity of the soul with 
Brahman, the Samkhya finds it in the recognition of the 
difference between the soul and nature. This recognition 
confers freedom ; for nature, once it is recognized by the 
soul as distinct, disappears together with all limitation and 
suffering: “ Prakritri, once recognized by Purusha, withdraws 
itself so as not to expose itself for a second time to the 
danger of this glance.” The assertion of the individuality of 
the soul as opposed to nature implies the multiplicity of 
souls. And this is another point of contrast between the 
Vedanta and the Samkhya : the former asserted the oneness 
of Atman ; the latter affirms the plurality of purushas.
IV. The Yoga philosophy is contained in the Sutras ascribed 
to Patangali, who is supposed to have lived during the 
second century n.c. In these Sutras we find practically all the 
metaphysical principles of the Samkhya and, in addition, 
certain doctrines in which the theistic element is insisted 
upon. Kapila had denied the possibility of proving the 
existence of Isvara, the personal creator and ruler : Patangali 
insists on the possibility of such proof. Of course, Isvara is 
not conceived as creator in our sense of the word, but 
merely as the highest of the purushas, all of which may be 
said to create inasmuch
INDIA
as they, by contemplating nature, cause nature to be 
productive. Among the means of deliverance practised by 
the Yogins were the observance of certain postures, 
meditation, and the repetition of the sacred syllable Cm.
V. The Nyaya philosophy is contained in the Nydya-Sutras. 
The founder of the system was Gotama, or Gautama. 
According to this system, the supreme resignation, or 
freedom, in which man’s highest happiness consists, is to be 
attained by a knowledge of the sixteen great topics of 
Nyaya philosophy. These topics (paddrthas) are means of 
knowledge, objects of knowledge, doubt, purpose, instance, 
established truth, premises, reasoning, conclusion, 
argumentation, sophistry, wrangling, fallacies, quibbles, 
false analogies, and unfitness for arguing. Taking up now the 
first of these, namely, the means of knowledge, we find that 
there are, according to the Nyaya philosophy, four kinds of 
right perception: sensuous, inferential, comparative, and 
authoritative. In order to arrive at inferential knowledge 
(annmaua), we must possess what is called vydpti, or 
pervasion, that is to say, a principle expressing invariable 
concomitance. So, for example, if we wish to infer that “this 
mountain is on fire,” we must possess the principle that 
smoke is pervaded by, or invariably connected with, fire. 
Once in possession of this principle, we have merely to find 
an instance, as, “this mountain smokes,” whence we 
immediately infer that “ it has fire.” But, while this is the 
comparatively simple means of acquiring inferential 
knowledge, we cannot impart this knowledge to others 
except by themorecomplicated process including : (1) 
Assertion, “The mountain has fire” ; (2) Reason, “ Because it 
smokes” ; (3) Instance, “ Look at the kitchen fire ” ; (4) 
Application, “ So too the mountain has smoke” ; and (5) 
Conclusion, “Therefore it has fire.” The process, in both 
cases, bears a close resemblance to the syllogism of 
Aristotelian logic; and it is by reason of the prominence 
given to this means of knowledge that the Nyaya philosophy 
came to be regarded as a system of logic. Yet the
24 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Nyaya philosophy is far from being merely a systematic 
treatment of the laws of thought ; for the syllogism is but 
one of the many means by which the soul or self {Atman) is 
to attain true freedom, a state in which all false knowledge 
and all inferior knowledge shall disappear, and all individual 
desire and personal love and hatred shall be extinguished.
VI. The Vaishcs/iika philosophy, founded by Kanada, is 
contained in the Vaishcshika-Siitras, which, according to Max 
Muller, date from the sixth century of the Christian era, 
although the Yaisheshika philosophy was known in the first 
century n.c. The system is closely related to the Nyaya 
philosophy, even its most characteristic doctrine, that of 
atomism, being found in undeveloped form in the philosophy 
of Gotama.1 Here, as in the Nyaya, supreme happiness is to 
be attained by the knowledge of certain padarthas, or quasi-
categories, namely: substance, quality, action {karmau), 
genus or community, species or particularity, inhesion or 
inseparability, and (according to some) privation or negation. 
The substances are earth, water, light, air, ether, time, 
space, self {atman), and mind {mamas). The qualities are 
color, taste, number, etc. These are called gunas, a word 
which occurs in the Upanishads and is a common term in all 
the six systems.
The four substances, earth, air, water, and light, exist 
either in the aggregate material state or in the state of 
atoms (anus). The single atom is indivisible and 
indestructible ; its existence is proved by the impossibility of 
division ad infinitum. Single atoms combine first in twos and 
afterwards in groups of three double atoms ; it is only in 
such combinations that matter becomes visible and liable to 
destruction.
To these six great historical systems, which were orthodox 
in so far as they recognized the supreme authority of the 
Veda, were opposed the heterodox systems of the heretics 
(Xastikas) who, like the Buddhists, the Jainas, and the 
Materialists, rejected the divine authority of the sacred 
writings.
1 Nvih'a-Sulras. IV, 2; if. Six Systems, p. 5S4.
INDIA 2 5
Buddhism, as is well known, was a distinctively religions 
system : it recognized suffering as the supreme reality in 
life, and devoted little or no attention to questions of 
philosophic interest, except in their relation to problems of 
conduct. “To cease from all wrong-doing, to get virtue, to 
cleanse one’s own heart,” — this, according to the 
celebrated verse, “ is the religion of the Buddhas.” 1 The 
four truths on which Buddhism is built are : (1) that suffering 
is universal ; (2) that the cause of suffering is desire ; (3) 
that the abolition of desire is the only deliverance from 
suffering ; and (4) that the way of salvation is by means of 
certain practices of meditation and active discipline. In 
connection with the second and third of these truths arises 
the problem of the meaning of karma and nirvana. In the 
Upanishad speculations karman, as we have seen, meant 
deed, and its eternity meant the continuous working of 
every thought, word, and work throughout all ages. In 
Buddhistic speculation the substantial permanence and 
identity of the soul are denied, and the only bond between 
the skandhas, or sets of qualities, which succeed each other 
in the individual body and soul, is the karma, the result of 
what man is and does in one existence or at one time being 
inevitably continued into all subsequent existences and 
times. The body is constantly changing, the qualities or 
states of the soul are constantly replaced by other qualities 
and states ; but the result of what a man is and does 
remains, — that alone is permanent. With regard to nirvana, 
modern scholars are not agreed as to whether it meant total 
annihilation or a state of painlessness in which positive 
existence is preserved. Max Muller and Rhys-Davids may be 
cited in favor of the latter interpretation.2 Rhys-Davids 
defi1 n   eQsu onteirdv bayn Rah yas-sD a“vtihdse,  Beuxdtdihniscmti o(Lno nodfo nt, h1aSt9 4s),i np.f u6’l., grasping 
con2 d   iCtifo. nM aoxf Muller, Bitddhaghoshas Parables, p. xli; Rhys-Davids, o^^it., 
p. in. Max Muller, however, admits that in a later and purely philosophical 
signification nirvana meant complete annihilation. Cf. Six Systems, p. 4S9.
26 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
mind and heart, which would otherwise, according to the 
mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual 
existence.” Jainism, like Buddhism, was a religious system. 
The only important speculative doctrine in which it differs 
from Buddhism is that of the substantial reality and 
permanence of the soul. Accordingly, the Jainas taught that 
nirvana is the freedom of the soul from the conditions which 
cause finiteness, suffering, and ignorance. In this respect 
they approach very closely to the speculation of the 
Upanishads.
PERSIA 1
The religion of ancient Persia and that of ancient India 
sprang from the same origin, namely, the ideas and usages 
which were shared alike by the Iranian and the Hindu 
branches of the original Aryan family. There are, indeed, 
traces of a civilization which existed in Persia prior to the 
Aryan invasion, and which closely resembled the Shamanism 
of the Accadians of ancient Chaldea. Little, however, is 
known of pre-Aryan Persia, All that can be said with certainty 
is that the Aryan invaders found already existing in Bactria 
and the neighboring regions a system of polytheism, which 
they replaced by a religion monotheistic in its tendency and 
similar in many respects to the religion of the Hindus of the 
Vedic period. The heaven god, known in India as Vanina, 
became the principal deity of the Iranians. Soma was also 
worshiped under the title Homa, and the distinction between 
Dcvas and Asuras (“shining ones” and “lords”) was 
employed in Persia as well as in India to designate two 
important classes of divinities. Gradually, however, a change 
was introduced : a tendency towards dualism became more 
and more strongly marked; the Dcvas came to be recognized
1 For bibliography, cf. De la Saussaye, Lehrbuch, II, 151. For original 
sources, cf. S.B.E., Vols. IV, XXIII, XXXI. Consult Catholic University Bulletin 
(July, 1S97), Vol. Ill, pp. 243 ff.
PERSIA 27
as evil deities, and the Ahuras (transliteration of Asitras) came 
to be looked upon as divinities friendly to man. “ The 
conflict between these opposites assumed a moral form in 
the minds of the Iranian wanderers ; the struggle between 
night and day, between the storm and the blue sky, of 
which the Yedic poets sang, was transformed into a struggle 
between good and evil. In place of the careless nature 
worshipers of the Panjab, a race of stern and earnest 
Puritans grew up among the deserts and rugged mountains 
of Ariana.”1
This dualistic conception of the universe, this antithesis 
between good and evil, was already in possession when 
Zoroaster, or Zarathustra, the great religious reformer, 
appeared, about the middle of the seventh or the beginning 
of the sixth century n.c.2 To him, according to Parsee 
tradition, is to be ascribed the inspired authorship of a 
portion, at least, of the Avcsta, or sacred literature of the 
Persians. This collection consists of five Gat/uxs, or hymns, 
written in an older dialect than that of the rest of the 
collection, the Gcudidad., or compilation of religious laws and 
mythical tales, and the Zend, or commentary. The first two 
portions constitute the Avcsta proper, that is to say, “ law ” or 
“knowledge.” In addition to the Avesta-Zend, there existed 
the Khorda Avcsta, or Small Avesta, which was a collection of 
prayers. Zoroaster’s share in the composition of these books 
is a matter which it is impossible, in the present condition of 
our knowledge, to determine. It is, however, beyond dispute 
that the sacred literature of the Persians reflects the beliefs 
which existed before the time of Zoroaster as well as those 
which Zoroaster introduced.
The religious reform effected by Zoroaster consisted in 
red1 u  c Sianygc et,o T htew Aon cmieonrt eE mopri rleess osf  vthaeg Euaest ,p pr.i n25c7ip. les the good and 
2
evil    For the date of Zoroaster and the question of his historical reality, cf 
Jackson, Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran (London and New York, 
1S99), pp. 3 and 14, and Appendixes I and II.
28 HISTORY OK PHILOSOPHY
dements in the universe. For him, as for his ancestors, the 
world is a vast battlefield, in which the forces of good and 
evil meet in a mighty conflict. But, instead of representing 
the contending forces as independent principles, manifold, 
yet capable of being classified as good and evil, he reduces 
all the conflicting powers to two, the good and the evil, of 
which the individual forces are derivatives. The good 
principle is called Alutra-mazda (Ormnzd, or Ormazd), and 
the evil principle is called Anra-mainyu (Ahrimdn). The 
former is conceived as light and day, the latter as darkness 
and night. From the former proceed the AJntras, or living 
lords (who were afterwards called Yazatas, or angels), and in 
general all that is good and beneficial to man : from the 
latter proceed the Dcvas, who opposed the Aluiras in the 
original conflict between day and night and who became the 
“ demons ” of latter Mazdeism, and, in general, from 
Ahriman comes all that is evil and injurious to man.
It is man’s duty to worship Onnazd (fire, being the sacred 
symbol, is also to be honored) by prayer, sacrifice, and the 
oblation of Homa (the juice of the sacred plant). It is also his 
duty to cultivate the soil and in other ways to promote the 
life and growth of the creatures of Onnazd, to destroy the 
works of Ahriman, to kill all venomous and noxious things, 
and to rid the earth of all creatures injurious to man.
At the end of twelve thousand years the present cosmic 
period will come to an end. Onnazd will finally triumph, for, 
although Ahriman is not inferior in power to Ormazd, he 
fights blindly and without adequate knowledge of the results 
of his actions ; therefore, he and his works will come to an 
end, and, after the final struggle, storm and night will cease, 
calm and sunshine will reign, and all will be absorbed in 
Ormazd. In this universal absorption in Ormazd the human 
soul will be included.
Mazdeism (the religion of Ormazd) in its later 
development attached great importance to the worship of 
Mithra, the sun god.
I’KRSIA 29
In this form it appeared in Rome and was among the first of 
the Oriental religions to gain ascendency over the minds of 
the Romans. Zoroastrianism was introduced as a heresy into 
the Christian Church by Manes, the founder of the 
Manichean sect.
Retrospect. In the systems of thought which flourished 
among the great historical nations of the East, there is, as 
has been observed, an almost complete lack of the rational 
element. In some of them, however, and especially in the 
Indian systems, there is abundance of speculation. Living in 
a country where there was practically no struggle for life, 
where the means of subsistence were produced without 
much effort on the part of the tillers of the soil, and where 
for thousands of years war was unknown save the war of 
extermination waged against the original dwellers in the 
land, the Hindus gave themselves up unreservedly to the 
solution of the problems, Whence are we come? Whereby do 
we live? and Whither do we go? In solving these problems, 
however, the Hindus, while they succeeded better than 
other Oriental peoples in separating the speculative from 
the mythological, failed to develop the rational or dialectical 
phase of thought. Their speculative systems are positive 
rather than argumentative. It was in Greece that philosophy 
as a dialectical, argumentative science found its first home.
There can be no doubt that the systems which have just 
been sketched exercised some, if only an indefinite, 
influence on the speculative efforts of the first philosophers 
of Greece. The geographical contiguity and the commercial 
intercourse of the Hellenic colonies with the countries of the 
interior of Asia render such a supposition probable. It was 
not, however, until Greek philosophy had run its practically 
independent course of national development, that the 
religious systems of the Orient were finally united with the 
great current of Greek thought, the East and the West 
pouring their distinctive contributions into the common 
stream of Greco-Oriental theosophy.
SECTION B
GREEK AND GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY
Origin. Greek philosophy first appeared in the Ionic 
colonies of Asia Minor, and never throughout the course of 
its development did it wholly lose the marks of its Oriental 
origin. Whether this influence was as preponderant as Roth 
and Gladiseh contend,1 or as unimportant as Zeller and 
others maintain,2 it is certain that the philosophy of Greece 
was characterized from the beginning by a spirit which is 
peculiarly Hellenic. The Greek looked out upon the world 
through an atmosphere singularly free from the mist of 
allegory and myth : the contrast between the philosophy of 
the East and the first attempts of the Ionian physicists is as 
striking as the difference between an Indian jungle and the 
sunny, breeze-swept shores of the Mediterranean.
Greek Religion exercised hardly more than an indirect 
influence on Greek philosophy. Popular beliefs were so crude 
as to their speculative content that they could not long 
retain their hold on the mind of the philosopher. 
Consequently, such influence as they directly exercised was 
antagonistic to philosophy. Yet it was the popular beliefs 
which, by keeping alive among the Greeks an exquisite 
appreciation of form and an abiding sense of symmetry, did 
not permit the philosopher to take a partial or an isolated 
view of things. In this way Greek religion indirectly fostered 
that imperative desire for a totality of view which, in the 
best days of Greek speculation, enabled
1 Cf. Zeller, Pro-Socratii Philosophy, Yol. I, pp. 35 ff.
- Cf. ibid.
3°
CtREEK POETRY 31
Greek philosophy to attain its most important results. In 
one particular instance Greek religion contributed directly 
to Greek philosophy by handing over to philosophy the 
doctrine of immortality, — a doctrine which in every stage 
of its philosophical development has retained the mark of 
its theological origin. Plato, for example, distinctly refers it 
to the (Bacchic and Orphic) mysteries.1
Poetry. The philosophy as well as the religion of the 
Greeks found its first expression in poetry, philosophical 
speculation, properly so called, being preceded by the 
effort of the imagination to picture to itself the origin and 
the evolution of the universe. Homer presents, without 
analyzing, types of ethical character : Achilles, the 
indomitable ; Hector, the chivalrous ; Agamemnon, of 
kingly presence; Nestor, the wise; Ulysses, the wary; 
Penelope, the faithful. Hesiod gives us the first crude 
attempts at constructing a world-system. His cosmogony, 
however, is presented in the form of a theogony; there is as 
yet no question of accounting for the origin of things by 
natural causes. The so-called Orphic Cosmogonies had the 
Hesiodic theogony for their basis. They did not advance 
much farther in their inquiry than Hesiod himself had gone, 
unless we include as Orphic those systems of cosmology to 
which all scholars now agree in assigning a postAristotelian 
date. Pherecydes of Syros (about 540 B.C.) more closely 
approaches the scientific method. He describes Zeus, 
Chronos, and Chthon as the first beginnings of all things. 
There is here a basic thought that the universe sprang from 
the elements of air and earth, through the agency of time. 
This thought, however, the poet conceals under 
enigmatical symbols, referring the phenomena of nature 
notT thoe  nbaetugrianln ainggesn coief sm, bourat lt op hthileo sionpcohmy parreeh efonusinbdle  ianc ttihoen  
oeft hthicea lg poodrst.rayals of the Homeric poems, in the writings of 
the Gnomic 1 Cf. PhuJo, 69, 70.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Poets of the sixth century B.C., and especially in the sayings 
attributed to the Seven Wise Men. These sayings are 
characterized by a tone of cynicism, and exhibit a 
knowledge of the world’s ways which is certainly remarkable 
if it belongs to the age to which it is generally assigned.1
The Division of Greek philosophy into periods and schools 
is partly chronological and partly dependent on the 
development of philosophic thought. The following seems to 
be the most convenient arrangement :
I. Prc-Socratic Philosophy.
II. Philosophy of Socrates and the Socvatic Schools.
III. Post-Aristotelian Philosophy.
In the first period, the era of beginnings, philosophical 
speculation was largely objective ; it busied itself with the 
study of nature and the origin of the world. In the second 
period Socrates brought philosophy down to the 
contemplation of man’s inner self ; it was a period in which 
the objective and subjective methods were blended. In the 
third period the subjective element was made 
preponderant ; the Stoics and Epicureans concerned 
themselves with man and his destiny, to the almost 
complete exclusion of cosmological and metaphysical 
problems.
Sources. The sources of Greek philosophy are:
Primary sources. Besides the complete works of Plato and Aristotle, we 
have several collections of fragments of philosophical writings; for instance, 
Mullach’s Fragmenta Philosophorum Greecorum, Ritter and Preller’s Historia 
Philosophies Graces, Diels’ Doxographi Greed, Fairbanks’ The First 
Philosophers of Greece. Adams, Texts, etc. (New York, 1903).
1 Flato’s story (Protagoras, 343 A) of the meeting of the Seven Wise Men 
at Delphi is totally devoid of historical foundation. Even the names of the 
seven are not agreed upon. The enumeration which most frequently occurs 
is the following: Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Solon, Cleobulus, Chilo, and 
I’eriander. Cf. Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. Grace (ed. 1S8S), p. 2, note d.
PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
00n
Secondary sources, (i) Ancient writers, such as Plato, Aristotle, 
Xenophon, and Theophrastus,1 in reference to pre-Socratic and Socratic 
philosophy; (2) Alexandrian authorities, such as Demetrius of Phalerus 
(third century B.C.), Ptolemy Philadelphus (third century B.c.), Callimachus 
(third century B.C.), author of the 7rtVa«£9 or tablets ” ; (3) Later writers: 
Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Diogenes 
Laertius (about A.D. 220); (4) Modern critics and historians : Tiedemann, 
Ritter and Preller, Zeller, Windelband, Diels, Tannery, Burnet, etc. Diels’ 
Doxographi Grceci (Berlin, 1S79) is of great value in determining the 
affiliation of sources.'2
FIRST PERIOD — PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
This period comprises: (1) the Ionian School—the 
philosophers of this school confined their attention to the 
study of Nature and sought out the material principle of 
natural phenomena ; (2) the Pythagoreans, who made 
Number the basis of their philosophical system ; (3) the 
E/catics, whose speculations centered in the doctrine of the 
oneness and immutability of
1    On Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, etc., as sources for 
the history of Greek philosophy, cf. Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of 
Greece (New York, 1898), pp. 263 ff.; also Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 
(London, !S9-)> PP- 370 ff.
2    Tiedemann, Griechenlands erste Philosophen (Leipzig, 1781) ; Ritter, 
History of Ancient Philosophy, trans. by Morrison (4 vols., Oxford, 1838); 
Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. Greeca: (Ed. VII, Gotha:-, 18SS); Zeller, Die 
Philosophic der Griechen (fiinfte Aufl., Leipzig, 1S92 ff.). (References will be 
made to the English translations by Alleyne and others under the titles Pre-
Socratic Philosophy, etc.) Tannery, Pour I'histoire de la science hellcne 
(Paris, 1SS7); Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy, trans. by 
Cushman (New York, 1S99); History of Philosophy, trans. by Tufts (second 
edition, New York and London, 1901).
To these add Erdmann, History of Philosophy, trans. by Hough (3 vols., 
London, 1S90) ; Benn, The Greek Philosophers (2 vols., London, 1SS3); The 
Philosophy of Greece (London, 1S9S); Gomperz, The Greek Thinkers, Vol. I, 
trans. by Magnus (London, 1901) ; Ueberweg, op. cit.; Schwegler, Gesch. 
der griech. Phil. (dritte Aufl., Tubingen, 1SS6).
For a more complete bibliography, cf. Weber, History of Philosophy, 
trans. by Thilly (New York, 1S96), p. S; Ueberweg, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 19 ff.; 
Erdmann, op. cit., pp. 14 If.
34 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Being; (4) the Sophists, who, negatively, showed the 
unsatisfactory nature of all Knowledge, while, positively, 
they occasioned the inquiry into the conditions and 
limitations of knowledge.
CHAPTER I EARLIER IONIAN SCHOOL
The Ionian school includes the Earlier Ionians,—Thales, 
Anaximander, and Anaximenes, — and the Eater Ionians, 
whose proper historical place is after the Eleatid school.
THALES
Life. Thales, the first philosopher of Greece, was of Phoenician descent. 
He was born at Miletus, about the year 620 B.C.1 He was a contemporary of 
Croesus and Solon, and was counted among the Seven Wise Men. He is said 
to have died in the year 546 i;.c.
Sources. Our knowledge of the doctrines of Thales is based entirely on 
secondary sources, especially on the account given by Aristotle in Met., I, 3, 
983. Cf Ritter and Preller, op. cit., pp. 9-1 1.
DOCTRINES
According to Aristotle, Thales taught that out of water all 
things are made.2 Historical tradition is silent as to the 
reasons by which Thales was led to this conclusion. It is 
possible, as Aristotle conjectures, that the founder of the 
Ionian school was influenced by the consideration of the 
moisture of nutriment, etc.; he may have based his 
conclusion on a rationalistic interpretation of the myth of 
Oceanus, or he may have observed the alluvial deposits of 
the rivers of his native country, and concluded that, as earth, 
so all things else come from water. The saying that
1 On the manner of computing the date of Thales, cf. Burnet, op. cit., pp. 
36 ff.
- Met., T, 3, 983 b.
ANAXIMANDER 35
“The magnet has a soul because it attracts iron ” is 
attributed to Thales on the authority of Aristotle, who, 
however, speaks conditionally, “ if, indeed, he said,” etc. We 
must not attach importance to Cicero’s Stoical interpretation 
of Thales: “Thales Milesius aquam dixit esse initium rerum, 
Deum, autem, earn mentem qum ex aqua cuneta fingeret.” 
Such a dualism belongs to the time of Anaxagoras. 
Similarly, the saying that “All things are full of gods ” 
(7rdvra 7rX?/p?/ dewv) is but the expression, in Aristotle’s 
own phraseology, of the general doctrine of animism, or 
hylozoism, which is a tenet common to all the Earlier 
Ionians. They maintained that matter is instinct with life ; or, 
as an Aristotelian would say, they did not distinguish 
between the materia] principle and the formal principle of 
life.
ANAXIMANDER
Life. Anaximander, who was also a native of Miletus, was born about 
the year 610 r>.c. Theophrastus describes him as a disciple, or associate, 
of Thales. The date of his death is unknown.
Sources. Primary sources. Anaximander composed a treatise, or 
rather a poetical prose composition, Tve.pl v.
4    Met., IV, 5, 1010 a, 13, and De An., I, 2, 405 a, 25.
HERACLITUS 55
meant invisible warm matter rather than the fire which is 
the result of combustion. It is endowed with life, or at least 
with the power of Becoming—“All things are exchanged for 
fire and fire for all things, just as wares are exchanged for 
gold and gold for wares.”1 It is, therefore, what Aristotle 
would call the material as well as the efficient cause of all 
things, — and here Heraclitus shows himself the lineal 
descendant of the Earlier Ionians. Moreover, since all things 
proceed from fire according to fixed law, fire is styled Zeus, 
Deity, Logos, Justice.
This account would, however, be incomplete without 
some mention of the force which is postulated by Heraclitus 
as coeternal with fire. “Strife is the father of all, and king of 
all, and some he made gods, and some, men.”2 Opposed to 
strife, which gave rise to things by separation, is harmony, 
which guides them back to the fire whence they came. 
These expressions, however, while they speak the language 
of dualism, are not to be understood as more than mere 
figures of speech, for fire, and fire alone, is the cause of all 
change.
Origin of the World. The world was produced by the 
transformations of the primitive fire. There is a cycle of 
changes by which fire through a process of condensation, or 
rather of quenching (crjBevvvadaL), becomes water and 
earth. This is the downward way. And there is a cycle of 
changes by which through a process of rarefaction, or 
kindling (ciTTTeadcu), earth goes back to water and water to 
fire. This is the upward way. Now, the one is precisely the 
inverse of the other : oSo? avco KCLTW
Thus did the world originate and thus does it constantly 
tend to return whence it came. Concord is ever undoing the 
work of strife, and one day strife will be overcome ; but then 
the Deity, as it were in sport,4 will construct a new world in 
which strife and concord will once more be at play.
1 Frag. 22.    2 Frag. 44.    3 Frag. 69.
4 Frag. 79; cf. note a pud Fairbanks, of. cit., p. 42.
56 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Doctrine of Opposites. From this continual change comes 
the doctrine of opposites. There is a constant swaying (like 
the bending and relaxing of a bow 1), in which all things pass 
successively through their opposites: heat becomes cold, 
dryness becomes moisture, etc. To produce the new, like 
must be coupled with unlike ; high and low, the accordant 
with the discordant, are joined, that out of one may come all, 
and out of all, one. On account of this doctrine Heraclitus is 
censured by Aristotle2 * and his commentators for denying 
the principle of contradiction. Hegelians, on the other hand, 
credit Heraclitus with being the first to recognize the unity of 
opposites, the identity of Being and not-Being.2 The truth is 
that Heraclitus deserves neither the blame of the 
Aristotelians nor the praise of the Hegelians. He does not 
affirm opposite predicates of the same subject at the same 
time and sub codem respectu. Moreover, his is a physical, 
not a logical, theory, and to maintain the unity of opposites 
in the concrete is not the same as to hold the identity of 
Being and not-Being in the abstract.
Anthropological Doctrines. Man, body and soul, originated 
from fire. The body is of itself rigid and lifeless, an object of 
aversion when the soul has departed from it. The soul, on the 
other hand, is divine fire preserved in its purest form. “The 
driest soul is wisest and best.” 4 If the soul fire is quenched 
by moisture, reason is lost. Like everything else in nature, 
the soul is constantly changing. It is fed by fire, or warm 
matter, which enters as breath or is received through the 
senses. Notwithstanding this view, Heraclitus in several of 
the fragments speaks of future reward and of the fate of the 
soul in Hades.5
Heraclitus distrusted sense-knowledge. “ Eyes and ears,” 
he s1 aFridag, .“ 4a5r.e    b 2a Mde tw., iItVn, e3s, s1e00s5 t ob .men, if they have souls that
Cf. Hegel, Gesch. der Phil.. I, 305; ICerke, XIII, 305; trans. by Haldane,
I, 283.    4 Frag. 74.
Cf. Zeller, J’/ e-Soem/ie Phil., II, 85.
J HERACLITUS 57
understand not their language.” 1 Rational knowledge is 
alone trustworthy. Heraclitus, however, did not, nor did any 
of the pre-Socratic philosophers, attempt to determine the 
conditions of rational knowledge. That task was first 
undertaken by Socrates.
Ethical Doctrines. Heraclitus did not undertake a 
systematic treatment of ethical questions. Nevertheless, he 
prepared the way for Stoicism by teaching that Immutable 
Reason is the law of the moral as well as of the physical 
world. “ Men should defend law as they would a fortress.”2 
We must subject ourselves to universal order if we wish to 
be truly happy : “the character of a man is his guardian 
divinity.” 3 This is the doctrine of contentment, or 
equanimity (evapecrrricns), in which, according to the 
Heracliteans, Heraclitus placed the supreme happiness of 
maHni.storical Position. Even in ancient times Heraclitus was 
regarded as one of the greatest physicists. He was 
deservedly styled 6 (fjvcn/cos ; for, while others among the 
philosophers of nature excelled him in particular points of 
doctrine, he had the peculiar merit of having established a 
universal point of view for the study of nature as a whole. 
He was the first to call attention to the transitoriness of the 
individual and the permanence of the law which governs 
individual changes, thus formulating the problem to which 
Plato and Aristotle afterwards addressed themselves as to 
the paramount question of metaphysics. The nai've 
conception of the universe as evolved, according to the 
Earlier Ionians, from one substance, by a process which 
may be witnessed in a water tank, now gives place to the 
notion of a world ruled in its origin and in all its processes 
by an all-pervading Logos. Moreover, though Heraclitus 
formulated no system of epistemology, his distrust of the 
senses and his advocacy of rational knowledge show that 
philosop1h Fyra hg.a 4d. begun to 3 eFmrage.r gioeo . f r o 3m Fr atgh.e 1 2s1ta. te of primitive 
innocence. It was this germ of
YS 1 1 1  STORY OK PHILOSOPHY
criticism which was developed into full-grown Scepticism by 
Cratylus, while along another line of development it led to 
the critical philosophy of the Sophists and to the Socratic 
doctrine of the concept.
Heraclitus and the Eleatics were, so to speak, at opposite 
poles of thought. In the doctrines of Empedocles and the 
Atomists we can perceive the direct influence of the Eleatic 
school.
EMPEDOCLES
Life. Empedocles, who is the most typical representative of the 
Later Ionian school, holds a middle course between the monism of 
Parmenides and the extreme panmetabolism of Heraclitus. He was born 
at Agri-gentum, in Sicily, about the year 490 i;.c. According to Aristotle, 
he lived sixty years. The tradition which represents Empedocles as 
traveling through Sicily and southern Italy and claiming divine honors 
wherever he went is only too abundantly proved by fragments of his 
sacred poems. The story, however, that he committed suicide by 
leaping into the crater of Etna is a malicious invention ; it is always 
mentioned with a hostile purpose, and usually in order to counteract 
some tale told by his adherents and admirers.
Sources. Empedocles, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, 
composed two poetico-philosophical treatises, the one metaphysical 
(wept c^iicrews), and the other theological (xufttp/xoi). Of the five 
thousand verses which these poems contained, only about four hundred 
and fifty have come down to us. On account of the language and 
imagery which Empedocles employs, he is styled by Aristotle the first 
rhetorician}
DOCTRINES
Metaphysics. Empedocles, like Parmenides, begins with a 
denial of Becoming. Becoming, in the strict sense of 
qualitative change of an original substance, is unthinkable. 
Yet, with Heraclitus, he holds that particular things arise, 
change, decay, and perish. He reconciles the two positions 
by teaching that generation is but the commingling, while 
decay1  Cfi.s Z etlhleer,  Psree-pSaocrarattiiocn P hiol.,f  II,p 1r1im9, inti.ve s2u Vbesrtsaens c9eSs ff .which 
themselves remain unchanged.2
IAlkBDOCLES 59
The primitive substances are four: fire, air, earth, and 
water; these afterwards came to be known as the Four I 
dements. Empedocles calls them roots (recrcrapa TWV 
TTCWTWV pi^M/jiard). The word elements {crroL^ela) was 
first used by Plato. The mythological names which 
Empedocles applied to these radical principles of Being have 
no particular philosophical value ; they may be regarded as 
the accidents of poetical composition. The elements are 
underived, imperishable, homogeneous. Definite substances 
are produced when the elements are combined in certain 
proportions. Now, the moving cause, the force, which 
produces these combinations is not inherent in the elements 
themselves; it is distinct from them. Here we have the first 
word of mechanism in Greek philosophy. It is true, 
Empedocles speaks of this force as love and hatred} but the 
phraseology merely proves that the idea of force is not yet 
clear to the Greek mind : Empedocles does not define the 
difference between force and matter on the one hand, and 
between force and person on the other. Moreover, to deny 
that Empedocles was a dualist, to explain that by love and 
hatred he meant merely a poetical description of the 
conditions of mixture and separation, and not the true 
causes of these processes, would imply that Aristotle and all 
our other authorities misunderstood the whole doctrine of 
Empedocles.
Cosmological Doctrines. The four elements were originally 
combined in a sphere (evScupLoveo-TaTos Oeos) where love 
reigned supreme.2 Gradually hatred began to exert its 
centrifugal influence ; love, however, united the elements 
once more to form those things which were made. And so 
the world is given over to love and hatred, and to the 
endless pulsation of periodic changes.
Biological Doctrines. Empedocles seems to have devoted 
special atte1n Vteiorsne  t8o0 .the study o2f  AlirvisintJg M oertg., aI,n 4is, m9Ss5.  Pal.ants first 
sprang from the earth before it was illumined by the sun ; 
and
6o HISTORY OF Fill I.OSOFHY
then came animals, which were evolved out of all sorts of 
monstrous combinations of organisms by a kind of survival of 
the fit ; for those only survived which were capable of 
subsisting.1 In this theory Empedocles expressly includes 
man.
The cause of growth in animals and plants is fire striving 
upwards impelled by the desire to reach its like, the fire 
which is in the sky. Blood is the seat of the soul, because in 
blood the elements are best united.2 It is by reason of the 
movement of the blood that inspiration and respiration take 
place through the pores which are closely packed together 
all over the body.3
Psychological Doctrines. Sense-knowledge is explained by 
the doctrine of emanations and pores.4 Like is known by like, 
that is, things are known to us by means of like elements in 
us, “earth by earth, water by water,” etc.5 In the case of 
sight, there is an emanation from the eye itself, which goes 
out to meet the emanation from the object.6 Thought and 
intelligence are ascribed to all things, no distinction being 
made between corporeal and incorporeal. Thought, 
therefore, like all other vital activities, depends on the 
mixture of the four elements.7 Yet Empedocles seems to 
contrast the untrustworthiness of sense-knowledge with 
knowledge acquired by reflection, or rather with knowledge 
acquired by all the powers of the mind.8 He did not conceive 
the soul as composed of elements ; he did not consider it as 
an entity apart from the body; he merely explained its 
activities by the constitution of the body. In his sacred poem, 
however, he adopted the doctrine of transmigration, 
borrowing it from Pythagorean and Orphic tradition, without 
making it part of his scientific theories. “ Once ere now I was 
a y1o Vuetrhs,e sa n24d5 -a2 7m0.a  i d 2e Tnh,e aop shhr.r, uDbe, S aen bsui,r d1,0 ;a cnf.d D aie lfis,s ohp .t ahta., tp .s w50i2m. s 
in s3i lVeenrscees  i2nS Sth ffe.   s  e4 aV.e”r9se 2S1.    5 Verse 333.    6 Verses 316 ff .
7 Zeller, Pre-Socratic Phil., II, 167.    8 Verse 19.
9 Verse 3S3. For various readings of this line, cf. Ritter and l’reller, op. cit., p. 150.
AN AX A( 1  OR AS 6 I
Concerning the Gods. Empedocles sometimes speaks as if 
he held the common polytheistic belief. Sometimes, on the 
contrary, as in verses 345 to 350, he describes the Deity 
almost in the words of Xenophanes: “He is sacred and 
unutterable mind, flashing through the whole world with 
rapid thoughts.” Still, Empedocles apparently found no 
means of introducing this concept of the Deity into his 
account of the origin of the universe.
Historical Position. While Empedocles holds a recognized 
place among the Greek poets, and while Plato and Aristotle 
appear to rank him highly as a philosopher, yet scholars are 
not agreed as to his precise place in the history of pre-
Socratic speculation. Ritter classes him with the Eleatics, 
others count him among the disciples of Pythagoras, while 
others again place him among the Ionians on account of the 
similarity of his doctrines to those of Heraclitus and the 
early Physicists. The truth, as Zeller says, seems to be that 
there is in the philosophy of Empedocles an admixture of all 
these influences, — Eleatic (denial of Becoming, 
untrustworthiness of the senses), Pythagorean (doctrine of 
transmigration), and Ionic (the four elements and love and 
hatred, —these being an adaptation of Heraclitean ideas). It 
would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the 
originality of Empedocles as a philosopher. It was he who 
introduced the notion of element, fixed the number of 
elements, and prepared the way for the atomistic 
mechanism of Leucippus. The defects, however, of his 
metaphysical system are many, chief among them being, as 
Aristotle 1 remarked, the omission of the idea of an 
intelligent Ruler under whose action natural processes 
would be regular instead of fortuitous.
ANAXAGORAS
Life. Anaxagoras was born at Clazomenm about 500 n.c. Aristotle 
-says that he was “ prior to Empedocles in point of age, but 
subsequent to him in respect to doctrine.” From his native city he went 
to Athens, where
l Dc Gen. et Corr., II, 6, 333 b,    2 Met., I, 3, 984 a, 11.
6 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
he was for many years the friend of Pericles, and where he counted 
among his disciples the dramatist Euripides. When, shortly before the 
outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles was attacked, Anaxagoras 
was tried on the charge of impiety, but escaped from prison and, 
returning to his native Ionia, settled in Lampsacus, where he died about 
the year 430 i;.c.
Sources. Diogenes Laertius says that Anaxagoras wrote a work 
which, like most of the ancient philosophical treatises, was entitled irtpl 
(f>vcrews. Of this work Plato speaks in the Apologyj in the sixth 
century of our era Simplicius could still procure a copy, and it is to him 
that we owe such fragments as have come down to us. These 
fragments were edited by Schau-bach in 1827, and by Schorn in 1829. 
They are printed by Mullach.1
DOCTRINES
Starting Point. Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras starts with 
the denial of Becoming, and, like Empedocles also, he is 
chiefly concerned to explain, in accordance with this denial, 
the plurality and change which exist. He differs, however, 
from Empedocles, both in his doctrine of primitive 
substances and in his doctrine of the cosmic force which 
formed the universe.
Doctrine of Primitive Substances. Anaxagoras maintained 
that all things were formed out of an agglomerate of 
substances in which bodies of determinate quality — gold, 
flesh, bones, etc. — were commingled in infinitely small 
particles to form the germs of all things.2 This agglomerate 
was called by Aristotle Ta ofxoLOfxeprj; it was called by 
Anaxagoras seeds (onreppara) and things (■gppp.aTa). So 
complete was the mixture, and so small were the particles of 
individual substances composing it, that at the beginning no 
substance could be perceived in its individual nature and 
qualities, and accordingly the mixture as a whole might be 
said to be qualitatively indeterminate, though definite 
qualities were really present in it. Yet, minute as were the 
primitive particles, they were divisible. Thus the 
agglomerate on the1  Fornagem henatna,d V orel. mT,i nppd.s 2 4u9s  ffo.2f  Ftlhage.  a1.nreipov of 
Anaximander, and
ANAXA( iORAS 63
on the other hand bears a certain analogy to the atomistic 
concept of matter.
Mind (NoO?) is the moving power which formed the 
world from the primitive mass of “seeds.” Anaxagoras is 
the first to introduce into philosophy the idea of the 
supersensible, for which reason Aristotle describes him 1 as 
standing out “ like a sober man from the crowd of random 
talkers who preceded him.” Mind is distinguished from 
other things because (1) it is simple—everything else is 
mingled of all things ; mind alone is unmixed. It is “the 
thinnest of all things and the purest.” (2) It is self-ruled 
(haavsr osKupraermf).e    p (o3w) eItr  hoavse ra alll lk tnhoinwglesd,2ge about everything. (4) 
It However, as Plato and Aristotle point out, Anaxagoras 
did not work out his theory of mind in the details of the 
cosmic processes. He did not formulate the idea of design, 
nor did he apply the principle of design to particular cases. 
Mind was for him merely a world-forming force. There is, 
moreover, a certain vagueness attaching to the idea of 
Non?. Without entering into the details of the question of 
interpretation,3 we may conclude that although Anaxagoras 
certainly meant by the NoO? something incorporeal, he 
could not avoid speaking of it in terms which, taken 
literally, imply corporeal nature ; for it is the fate of new 
ideas to suffer from imperfect expression until philosophical 
terminology has adjusted itself to the new conditions which 
theCyo csrmeaotloeg. y. Mind, therefore, first imparted to matter a 
circular motion4 separating Air (from which came water, 
earth, and stone, and whatever is cold, dark, and dense) 
and Ether (from which came whatever is warm, light, and 
rare). Throughout this account of the processes of things 
Anaxagoras considers
1 Met., I, 3, 984 b, 17.    2 Frag. 6.
3 Cf. Zeller, op. cit., II, 342 ff .; Arehiv f Gesch. der Phil., Bd. VIII (1S95),
pp. 151, 461-465; also Philosophical Review, Xol. IV (September, 1S95), P- 5^5>
and Mind, N.S., Vol. V (1S96), p. 210.    4 Frags. 7 and S.
6.| HISTORY OK PHILOSOPHY
the material cause only, thereby deserving Aristotle’s 
reproach, that he used the Non? merely as a Dens ex 
machina.
Psychology. Like is not known by like, but rather by 
unlike,1 and in this Anaxagoras is directly opposed to 
Empedocles. The senses are “weak but not deceitful ” ; the 
faculty of true knowledge is Nous', the principle of 
understanding, which is also2 an intrinsic psychic principle — 
the soul. Plutarch’s statement 3 that Anaxagoras represented 
the soul as perishing after its separation from the body is, to 
say the least, unreliable.
From the foregoing it is evident that Anaxagoras was not a 
Sceptic. The reason which he alleges for the 
untrustworthiness of the senses is that they see only part of 
what is in the object.4 The intellect, which is unmixed, is 
capable of seeing the everything which is in everything.
Historical Position. The special importance of the 
philosophy of Anaxagoras is due to his doctrine of immaterial 
mind. This doctrine implies the most pronounced dualism ; it 
contains in germ the teleological concept which was evolved 
by Socrates and perfected by Plato and Aristotle. It was only 
natural that these philosophers, who approached 
metaphysical problems with minds already accustomed to 
the idea of the immaterial, should blame Anaxagoras for not 
having made better use of that idea. But we must not 
underrate the service which Anaxagoras rendered to Greek 
philosophy by his doctrine of immaterial intellect.
Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus of Athens, who are 
sometimes included among the Later Ionian philosophers, 
exhibit a tendency towards a return to the hylozoism of the 
first philosophers.
1 Theophr., De Snisu. frag. 27 ; cf. Diels, Do.xografhi, p. 507.
- Arist., De An., T, 2, 40s a, 13.
3    Flacita, V, 25, 3 ; cf. Diels, of. at., p. 437.
4    Frag. 6.
LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS 65
CHAPTER V 
THE ATOMISTS
The Atomists represent the last phase of Ionian 
speculation concerning- nature. They accept the dualistic 
ideas which characterize the Later Ionian philosophy, but by 
their substitution of necessity for intelligent force they 
abandon all that dualistic philosophy had to beciucath to 
them, and fall lower than the level which the early 
hylozoists had reached.
It was at Miletus that the Ionian philosophy first 
appeared, and it was Miletus that produced Leucippus, the 
founder of Atomism, who virtually brings the first period of 
Greek philosophy to a close. So little is known of Leucippus 
that his 1 very existence has been questioned.1 His 
opinions, too, have ' been so imperfectly transmitted to us 
that it is usual to speak of the tenets of the Atomists 
without distinguishing how much we owe to Leucippus, who 
by Aristotle and Theophrastus is regarded as the founder of 
the system, and how much we owe to Democritus, who was 
the ablest and best-known expounder of atomistic 
philosophy. DEMOCRITUS
Life. Democritus of Abdera was born about the year 460 B.c. It is 
said — though it is by no means certain — that he received instruction 
from the Magi and other Oriental teachers. It is undoubtedly true that, 
at a later time, he was regarded as a sorcerer and magician, — a fact 
which may account for the legend of his early training. He was 
probably a disciple of Leucippus. There is no historical foundation for 
the widespread belief that he laughed at everything.2
Sources. If, as is probable, Leucippus committed his doctrines to 
writing, no trustworthy fragment of his works has reached us. From the 
titles and
1 if Burnet, op. tit., p. 350.
- Cf Zeller, Pre-Socratic Phil., II, 213,11.
66 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
the fragments of the works of Democritus it is evident that the latter 
covered in his written treatises a large variety of subjects. The most 
celebrated of these treatises was entitled /xcyas SUXKOCT/XOS. 
Mullach (.Fragmenta, I, 340 ff.) publishes fragments of this and other 
Democritean writings.
Aristotle in the Metaphysics and elsewhere gives an adequate 
account of the doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus.
DOCTRINES
General Standpoint. One of the reasons which led the 
Eleatics to deny plurality and Becoming was that these are 
inconceivable without void, and void is unthinkable. Now, 
the Atomists concede that without void there is no motion, 
but they maintain that void exists, and that in it exists an 
infinite number of indivisible bodies (aropoi) which 
constitute the plenum. Aristotle is therefore justified in 
saying1 that according to Leucippus and Democritus the 
elements are the full (7r\?}pe?) and the void fevov). The 
full corresponds to Eleatic Being and the void to not-Being. 
But the latter is as real as the former.2 On the combination 
and separation of atoms depend Becoming and decay.
The Atoms. The atoms, infinite in number and indivisible, 
differ in shape, order, and position,3 They differ, moreover, 
in quantity, or magnitude,4 for they are not mere 
mathematical points, their indivisibility being due to the 
fact that they contain no void. They have, as we would 
say, the same specific gravity, but because of their 
different sizes they differ in iveiyht
The Motion by which the atoms are brought together is 
not caused by a vital principle inherent in them 
(hylozoism),
1    Met., I, 4, 9S5 b, 4.
2    Cf. Arist., r/iys., IV, 6, 213 a, 31, for arguments by which the 
Atomists proved the existence of the void.
3    Arist., Met., I, 4, 985 b, 14.
4    Arist., Phys., Ill, 4, 203a, 33.
5    Arist., De Generatioue et Corruption', I, 8, 324 b and 325 a.
THE ATOM !STS 6 7
nor by love and hatred, nor by any incorporeal agency, but 
by natural necessity, by virtue of which atoms of equal 
weight come together. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that 
the Atom-ists explained the motion of the atoms by 
attributing it to chance. Aristotle gave occasion to this 
misunderstanding by identifying avTOfxaTov and Tv%i], 
though it is Cicero1 who is accountable for giving the 
misapprehension the wide circulation which it obtained.
The atomistic explanation was, therefore, that atoms of 
different weights fell with unequal velocities in the primitive 
void. The heavier atoms, consequently, impinged on the 
lighter ones, imparting to them a whirling motion (biinj). The 
Atomists, as Aristotle remarks,2 did not advert to the fact 
that in vacuo all bodies fall with equal velocity. Nowhere in 
the cosmological scheme of the Atomists is there place for 
mind or design ; it is utter materialism and casualism, if by 
casualism is meant the exclusion of intelligent purpose.
Anthropology. Plants and animals sprang from moist earth. 
Democritus, according to our authorities, devoted special 
attention to the study of Man, who, he believes, is, even on 
account of his bodily structure alone, deserving of 
admiration. He not only describes as minutely as he can the 
bodily organization of man, but, departing from his 
mechanical concept of nature, takes pains to show the utility 
and adaptation of every part of the human body. But over all 
and permeating all is the soul. Now the soul, for the 
Atomists, could be nothing but corporeal. It is composed of 
the finest atoms, perfectly smooth and round, like the atoms 
of fire." Democritus, accordingly, does not deny a distinction 
between soul and body. He teaches that the soul is the 
noblest part of man ; man’s crowning glory is moral 
excellence. He is said to have reckoned the human soul 
amo 41n  g   Dteh eAT adt.i vDicnoirtuime,s .I,  2A4n, d66 y. et, for3  D  e mAroisct.r,i tDues ,A na.,s  If, o2r,  e4v0e3 ry
2    Phys., IV, S, 215 a. b, 2S.
4    Cf Zeller, op. eit., II, p. 
262.
68 HISTORY OK PHILOSOPHY
materialist, the soul is but a finer kind of matter. Indeed, 
according to Aristotle,1 the Atomists identified soul-atoms 
with the atoms of fire which are floating in the air.
The Atomists’ theory of cognition was, of course, 
determined by their view of the nature of the soul. They 
were obliged to start out with the postulate that all cognitive 
processes are corporeal processes, and since the action of 
body upon body is conditioned by contact, they were 
obliged to conclude that all the senses are mere 
modifications of the sense of touch.2
The contact which is a necessary condition of all sense-
knowledge is effected by means of emanations (enroppoai, 
— the term is Aristotle’s), or images (eiBcoXa, BeitceXa). 
These are material casts, or shells, given off from the 
surface of the object; they produce in the medium the 
impressions which enter the pores of the senses. They are 
practically the same as the Epicurean effluxes, which 
Lucretius describes :
Qua?, quasi membrana?, suramo de corpore 
rerum Dereptce, volitant ultro citroque per 
auras.
Thought cannot differ essentially from sense-
knowledge. They are both changes frepoLwaeif of 
the soul-substance occasioned by material 
impressions. Logically, therefore, Democritus 
should have attached the same value to thought 
as to sense-knowledge, and since sense-
knowledge is obscure (CTKOTII]), he should have 
concluded that no knowledge is satisfactory. He 
saves himself, however, from absolute Scepticism, 
although at the expense of logical consistency ; for 
he maintains that thought, by revealing the 
1 De Respiratione, 4, 472 a, 30.
existence of invisible atoms, shows us the true 
’- Arist., Met., IV, 5, 1009 b, and De Sensu, 4, 442 a, 29.
nature Moeft ., tIVh,i n5g, 1s0. 09T hae, j S.d  o  c4 tCrfi.n Zee llewrh, oicph. c itA., rIIistotle3 
attributes to
O
Democritus is his opinion as to what Democritus 
should have taught, rather than an account of 
what he actually did teach.4
THE ATOM I STS 69
Ethics. Although most of the extant fragments which 
contain Democritus’ ethical teachings are merely isolated 
axioms without any scientific connection, yet our secondary 
authorities attribute to him a theory of happiness which is 
really the beginning of the science of ethics among the 
Greeks. From what Democritus says of the superiority of the 
soul over the body, of thought over sense, it is natural to 
expect that he should place man’s supreme happiness in a 
right disposition of mind and not in the goods of the external 
world. “ Happiness,” he says,1 “ and unhappiness do not 
dwell in herds nor in gold ; the soul is the abode of the 
Divinity.” Happiness is in no external thing, but in “ 
cheerfulness and well-being, a right disposition and 
unalterable peace of mind.” The word which is here 
rendered cheerfulness (eudvfu'a) is interpreted by Seneca 
and other Stoics as tranquillity. Democritus, however, was 
more akin to the Epicureans than to the Stoics, and it is 
probable that by evOvin'a he meant “delight” or “good 
cheer.”2 There is in the moral maxims of Democritus a note 
of pessimism. Happiness, he believes, is difficult of 
attainment, while misery seeks man unsought.
Historical Position. The atomistic movement is recognized 
as an attempt to reconcile the conclusions of the Eleatics 
with the facts of experience. It is not easy, however, to 
determine with accuracy how far the Atomists were 
influenced by their predecessors and contemporaries. Even 
if the dates of Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and 
Eeucippus were known more definitely than they are, it 
would still be a matter of no small difficulty to show in what 
degree each philosopher depended on and in turn 
influenced the thought and writings of the others. One thing 
is certain : it was Atomism which more than any of the other 
pre-Socratic systems prepared the way for Sophism and the 
consequent contempt of all knowledge.
1    Frag. 1.
2    Cf. Sidgwick, [list. of Ethics, p.  15.
;o HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
In the first place, atomistic philosophy was materialistic, 
and “ Materialism ends where the highest problems of 
philosophy begin.” Moreover, the armor of the Atomist 
offered several vulnerable points to the shafts of Sophism. 
He fallaciously concluded that atoms are uncaused because 
they are eternal ; and, what is worse, he inconsistently 
maintained the difference in value between sense-
knowledge and thought. The Sophists might well argue, as 
indeed some of them did argue, that if the senses are not to 
be trusted, reason also is untrustworthy, for the soul, 
according to the Atomists, is, like the senses, corporeal.
Thus did atomistic philosophy prepare the way for 
Sophism.
CHAPTER VI 
THE SOPHISTS
Sophistic philosophy, which 
constitutes so important a crisis in 
the history of Greek thought and 
civilization, was germinally contained 
in the preceding systems. Atomistic 
materialism culminated in the 
Sophism of Protagoras; the doctrines 
of Heraclitus paved the way to 
Scepticism, as was demonstrated by 
Cratylus, the teacher of Plato ; and 
Gorgias the Sophist merely carried to 
excess the dialectic method 
introduced by Zeno the Eleatic. All 
these schools — Atomistic, 
Heraclitean, Eleatic — had, as has 
been said, attacked by the aid of 
specious fallacies the trustworthiness 
of common consciousness, so that 
until Socrates appeared on the scene 
to determine the conditions of 
scientific knowledge no positive 
development of philosophy was 
possible. Meantime there was 
nothing left but to deny the 
possibility of attaining knowledge. 
And that is what the Sophists did: 
they are the first Sceptics of Greece.
There was, then, an inevitable 
tendency on the part of the prevalent 
philosophy to culminate in 
Scepticism. Besides, the
L'HK SOPHISTS 71
social and political conditions of the time contributed to the 
same result by unsettling the moral and religious ideals 
which the Athenian had hitherto held as matters of tradition. 
The Persian wars and the military achievements of 
subsequent years brought about an upheaval in the social 
and political condition of Athens. Old ideas were being 
adjusted to new circumstances, the scope of education was 
being widened; in a word, “the whole epoch was penetrated 
with a spirit of revolution and progress,” and none of the 
existing forces could hold that spirit in check. We must take 
into account also the development of poetry and especially 
of the drama. “The whole action of the drama,” says Zeller, 
“comic as well as tragic, is based (at this time) on the 
collision of duties and rights — on a dialectic of moral 
relations and duties.” 1 The period was one of revolution and 
readjustment.
History of the Sophists. The word Sophist, etymologically 
considered, denotes a wise man. In the earlier pre-Socratic period it 
meant one who made wisdom or the teaching of wisdom his 
profession. Later on, the abuse of dialectic disputation of which the 
Sophists were guilty caused the name sophism to become synonymous 
with fallacy.
The Sophists flourished from about 450 H.C. to 400 is.c.; not that 
Sophism as a profession disappeared altogether at the latter date, but, 
after the appearance of Socrates as a teacher, the importance of the 
Sophist dwindled into insignificance.
The first Sophists are represented as going about from city to city, 
gathering around them the young men and imparting to them in 
consideration of certain fees the instruction requisite for the conduct of 
public affairs. In the instruction which they gave theyr set no value 
upon objective truth ; indeed, the ideal at which they aimed was the 
art of making the worse seem the better cause, and vice versa. 
Readiness of exposition and presentation of arguments in a specious 
manner were all that they pretended to teach.
Such is the history of the school in general. The chief Sophists are 
Protagoras of Abdera, the individualist j Gorgias of Leontini, the nihilist; 
Hippias of Elis, the polymathis1t ;O apn. dfi Pt.r,o IdIi,c u40s3 o. f Ceos, the moralist.
7 2 HISTORY OK PHILOSOPHY
Sources. It is difficult, as Plato1 points out, to define accurately the 
nature of the Sophist. The Sophists left no fixed theorems equally 
acknowledged by all the school. They were characterized more by their 
mode of thought than by any fixed content of thought. Besides, Plato, 
Aristotle, and all our other authorities are so avowedly hostile to the 
Sophists, and raise so unreasonable objections to Sophism (as when 
they accuse the Sophists of bartering the mere semblance of 
knowledge for gold), that we must weigh and examine their every 
statement before we can admit it as evidence.
DOCTRINES
Protagoras of Abdera (born about 480 B.C.) composed 
many works, of which, however, only a few fragments have 
survived. Plato2 traces the opinions of Protagoras to the 
influence of Heraclitus. Nothing is, all is Becoming; but, 
even this Becoming is relative. As the eye does not see, 
except while it is being acted upon, so the object is not 
colored except while it acts upon the eye.3 Nothing, 
therefore, becomes in and for itself but only for the 
perHciepniecen,t  assu bthjeec to.bject presents itself differently to different 
subjects, there is no objective truth ; Man is tJtc measure of 
all things. Plato apparently reports these as the very words 
of Protagoras 4 :