Uploaded on Sep 8, 2020
This blog is not about the validity of any form of Image File Execution option attack. Nor are we discussing the advantages of this attack over the myriads of approaches that would allow for the attacker to misuse a Windows device. Once an attacker gains administrative privileges on a Windows machine through whatever means, which attacks the attacker may choose lies outside of this analysis. avg.com/retail. https://www.avg-com-retail.support/
Technical AVG Detail On DoubleAgent – Www.avg.com/retail
Technical AVG Detail On DoubleAgent –
Www.avg.com/retail
Technical AVG Detail On DoubleAgent AVG products / Intel Security has
been searching the impact of the so-called, “DoubleAgent zero-day”,
technique of Windows debugging capabilities.
This injection technique uses an MS Windows debugging feature that
requires administrative privileges. On the fly debugging is created to be
used with all Microsoft Windows executables. It’s not specific to
Antivirus products in general or AVG products in particular through
www.avg.com/retail.
Techniques using Image File Execution option have been known for a
number of years, as part of a continuing process to research and assess
security-related techniques against software and hardware that we all
depend upon. For example, similar techniques manipulating the
Windows process debugging registry key have been publicly discussed
for at least several years. Get support for AVG by www.avg.com/retail
expert.
This blog is not about the validity of any form of Image File Execution
option attack. Nor are we discussing the advantages of this attack over
the myriads of approaches that would allow for the attacker to misuse
a Windows device. Once an attacker gains administrative privileges on a
Windows machine through whatever means, which attacks the attacker
may choose lies outside of this analysis.
Rather, this analysis attempts to establish the resilience of AVG Internet
Security solutions to this type of injection attack, to enumerate the
mechanisms that are available to AVG’s customers to mitigate or
negate such attacks, and the ability of our solutions to expose such
attack attempts.
AVG software fundamentally must rely on the underlying operating
system. Where techniques are identified that could impact the integrity
of software through operating system mechanisms such as IFEO, AVG
software must implement detective and protective mechanisms. In this
particular technique, for example, we have implemented measures into
our most up-to-date consumer and enterprise products that would
prevent the execution of injected AVG binaries from malicious parties.
When it comes to our endpoint protection solutions and their ability to
protect their own processes, there are multiple layers of protection at
play.
For the most recent Internet Security Solution, AVG offers three
mechanisms: (Technical AVG Detail On DoubleAgent)
Self-protection rules to prevent the creation of lf-protection rules
to prevent the creation of IFEO registry keys
Self-protection rules to prevent process injection from untrusted
processes
Module sanitization to validate that a module (DLL) is validly
signed by a trusted authority before loading the DLL (irrespective
of the load mechanism, including injection)
You can find details about process injection self-protection and module
sanitization in the following avg.com/retail
Module sanitization is enforced by default in our (Internet Security
Solution).
Self-protection rules for the registry come in different flavors
depending on the AVG products installed. The default rules shipped
with the product protect core AVG services from allowing IFEO keys to
be created. Since the current shipping rules focus on core services, we
are pushing an update to add exhaustive coverage of all product
binaries for each product that uses AVG’s Anti-Malware Core
technologies, which includes Internet Security. For products using
VirusScan, rules can be manually added.
Technical AVG Detail On DoubleAgent In addition to covering an
exhaustive list of AVG binaries, the update for the self-protection
registry rules will also include coverage against a technique variant in
which a malicious Image File Execution Options key has been
constructed elsewhere and then renamed.
Depending on the Image File Execution Options injection target, the
system blocking the attack may differ. If the target is protected by self-
protection registry rules the attack will be mitigate. If the target is not
protected by self-protection registry rules, then the injection will occur
but then AVG’s module sanitization, where enforced, will block the
attempted load and revoke trust for the injected process. Get support
for AVG by avg.com/retail product key expert.
In the worst-case scenario for Internet Security, if the registry entry is
created and the injection occurs, the process will fail to launch because
the load of the malicious DLL will be denied. The AVG Internet Security
processes will not allow the malicious module to execute.
AVG products also offer generic protection that would prevent such
attacks on other non-AVG processes. In the context of Internet Security,
customers can enforce the “Hijacking .EXE or other executable
extensions” rule, which would prevent the creation of any
[program].exe key under IFEO. Dynamic Application Containment (DAC)
would also restrict contained processes from creating IEFO keys.
It is important for customers to note that before the IFEO keys may be
manipulated, an attacker must first gain entrance to a Windows system.
If the user account has not been given administrative privileges, then
an additional step must be taken by the attacker to achieve these
privileges. There are numerous techniques for achieving each of these
steps.
We will continue research into those techniques that target hardware
and software that we rely upon. This is crucial in providing customers
the confidence to rely upon systems that their businesses and homes
have grown to depend upon. Go to visit: avg.com/registration
#www.office.com/setup #www.webroot.com/safe
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